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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
AMERICAN SOCIAL WAGE, LABOR
ORGANIZATION AND LEGAL IDEOLOGYt
KENNETH M. CASEBEER*

[Charland] tells us, in effect, I worked 30 years for defendant
Norge. At the end I am thrown out of ajob unless I move hundreds
of miles to another city and start as a new employee behind
hundreds of local residents and without either accumulated seniority or pension rights. In the alternative if I sign a complete
release of all rights arising out of my job, I get $1,500. This is
fundamentally unfair And it is a deprivationof my property rights
in my job in violation of Article V of the Constitution ....
The claim presented by this appellant brings sharply into focus
such problems as unemployment crises, the mobility of capital,
technological change and the right of an industrial owner to go
out of business ....
Thus farfederal law has sought to protect
the human values to which appellant calls our attention by means
of such legislationas unemployment compensation ....
Charland v. Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp.1

t

Copyright © 1994 Kenneth Casebeer.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author expresses thanks to Martha
Mahoney, Dan Ernst, Joel Rogers, Steve Diamond, Chris Tomlins, Rob Rosen and Frank Munger
for discussion of earlier drafts, and to Joel Kiaff and Amy Horton for research assistance. The
author gratefully acknowledges the support of a grant for archival research from the Fund for
Labor Relations Studies. A condensed version of the section on the Workers' Bill appears as a
book chapter in the publication of the 1990 Schouler Lectures, LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HisTORICAL AND CRITICAL EssAys, (C. Tomlins & A. King eds., 1992). This Article is written as a
legal, and therefore discursive, practice. Specifically, it is written to allow the historical speakers
to make their own substantive points in the course of writing this Article. Quotations are not used
merely as gestures or as confirmation of the writer's opinion. Hence, there is frequent use of
block quotations in text. In segments written aboutjurisprudence, the voice is openly advocative.
This linguistic practice is intended to make clear the crosscutting and intertwined meanings of
recovering lost voices and foregone alternatives, and at the same time, offering an immanent
critique of legal practices. An immanent critique takes the currently held standards of practice
as given and shows how they are only formally being met or not met at all. The critique of practice
makes apparent the political economy of unemployment insurance law in its current functioning.
I Charland v. Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp., 407 E2d 1062, 1064-65 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 1927 (1969).
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[An employee] surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return
receives a compensation package that is substantially devoid of
aspects resembling a security .... Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily
to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment.
2
Justice Lewis Powell

One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his services for the least possible return.
Justice Oliver W. Holmes3
This is an essay about power, the denial of power and the complicity of law. It is about the lies that orthodox history permits in legal
discourse, and historical fabrications which the orthodox jurisprudence perpetuates as an official past. Orthodox history distorts when
it omits the alternative voices of ordinary people, against whom the
records of elite institutions were entered, sometimes in recognition,
sometimes in opposition, sometimes in compromise forced by social
contest. The distortions ofjurisprudence stem from the limiting claims
of its own internal standards of practice, standards which assume that
the contests of legislation or the courtroom reach an eventual episodic
end. Whether by methods labeled original intent, legislative history,
stare decisis, canons of interpretation, or regular procedure, legal
meaning finds its justification through the process of adjudication. The
underlying social contest is therefore remembered as an artifact-the
pre-history of the legal issues into which the social conflict is translated
and thereby mediated.
Taken together, these versions of history and law belie the continuous social struggle over the terms and conditions of social organization.4 Under their thrall one forgets that the dominance of a particular view is only relative, and it only achieves that status through the
exercise of power. We are led to believe, therefore, that legal discourse
2

1nternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (vested pension rights

do not qualify as security under regulation of Security and Exchange Commission).
3Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4
"[A]nalysis of social transformation starts with recognition of the nexus of antagonism
binding together dominant and subordinate groups." ALAN DAWLEY, Workers, Capital, and the
State in the 20th Century, in PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LABOR HISTORY: THE PROBLEMS OF
SYNrHESIS 152, 154 (J. Carroll Moody & Alice Kessler-Harris eds., 1989).
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proceeds on natural or shared assumptions, rather than through the
experience of contested power.5 Both our conventional, institutionally
driven history and our judicial interpretations are artificial constructs.
Legislative interpretation does not recognize the traces of the social
struggles which culminate in the language of statutes. With the underlying conflict repressed, legislation and precedent take on the winners'
interpretation. This Article uses the law and history of unemployment
insurance to critique the Law's exclusion of alternate voices and to
recall the alternatives through which the prevailing legal ideology in
this area of law should be understood.
American legal, political, and intellectual culture generally associates social upheaval, from the American Revolution to the Civil War to
the Great Depression, with radical changes in the consciousness of law
and the structure of the state. 6 Yet without minimizing the impact of
extraordinary destabilization upon political division, cataclysms also
magnify latent divisions and movements associated with those alienated
from preexisting social conditions. Paradoxically, crises such as the
depths of unemployment during the Depression are devalued as atypical-not the ordinary conditions of ongoing legal connection to society-as if social struggle only interrupts periods of consensus and calm.
This assumption dims our legal understanding that law would not be
functionally challenged during social crises if it were not functioning
normally to mediate conflict by setting the terms within which society
reproduces itself.7 It is less that law itself is continuously contested than
that law is a means by which social conditions are known and constructed. Contests over those social conditions are inherently relevant
to this synchronomy of power. History as it is written by the winners
supports the legitimacy of law's neutrality, and the law which is defined
by winners consolidates existing forms of social power.
In the American experience, the legal structure of labor markets
assumes that conflicts over the terms of employment are resolved
consensually in the bargaining process.8 As a matter of legal vision, free
labor entails free capital. The return accorded to each creates constraints on self interest and, therefore, public reactions to the conse5

SeeKarl E. Klare, ThePublic/PlrivateDistinctionin Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1358
(1982).
6 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 454
(1989).
7 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACTS 258-69 (1975).
8 Kenneth M. Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog New Ticks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will
Employment Revisited, 6 CARDoZO L. REV. 765, 773 (1985).
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quences of the private wage constitute compulsory or, at best, additive
terms to the value and form of the private wage bargain. The extent
of the social wage, therefore, gains its conceptual meaning in relation
to prevailing market rates and not public determination of the minimum owed to workers for their social contribution.9 As a matter of
legal construction, an employee has property in his or her labor time
not in the job itself. That is what gives a worker the legal status of an
employee. It is also what conceptually excludes unemployment from
ordinary labor law and labor market organization. While this appears
natural in legal discourse, in fact it represents a contingent and inescapably political choice. A conception of the employment relationship
and the worker's relation to the state that is perceived as natural rather
than chosen reflects untested ideology. This ideology of labor law
functionally denies alternative arguments and legal constructions, and
especially insulates legal analysis by reducing social conflict to a mere
object of analysis.
An examination of the history of workers' political struggle for a
social wage makes it clear that the wrenching wage insecurity of the
Depression was not uniformly understood to be just a private matter.
Nevertheless, judicial construction of the eligibility requirements for
unemployment insurance creates the impression that no struggle over
social security ever occurred. And even if there was social and political
debate, it was of no significance to current judicial construction of the
eligibility requirements.
To the contrary, the Unemployment Insurance enacted as part of
the Social Security Act was contested, and it developed in part as a
response to a radical proposal for a social wage. This Article, therefore,
first tells the story of the workers' fight for social change. It then
demonstrates how social security legislation developed in reaction to
workers' politics. Finally, it chronicles a conservative judicial retrenchment of social policy, a retrenchment facilitated by ignoring the contest
over its passage. The Article concludes that a more historically and
socially faithful jurisprudence would recognize and incorporate the
social struggle underlying the legal function. Each of these four sections is self-contained and makes its own point, but, taken together,
they form a multi-faceted illustration of power as it is exercised through
9 See generally Roy LUBovE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-1935, at 144-74
(1968). For a general history of unemployment and its relation to public policy in earlier
American history, see generallyJOHN A. GARRATY, UNEMPLOYMENT IN HISTORY (1978); Atcx.jANDER KEYSSAR, OUT OFWoRK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS (1986).
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a legal doctrine which is driven by a particular political economy.
Section I rediscovers the struggle to enact the Workers' Bill for Unemployment Insurance and its connection to the organization of labor
and to labor politics. It thus intervenes in labor history debates over
American exceptionalism-the idea that the United States is exceptional among industrial nations for never developing a serious labor
or socialist party, and only developed fragmented and decentralized
organizations unions. 0 It intervenes by suggesting that labor's relation
to the state is less exceptional than particular. Section II illustrates the
contemporaneous policy behind enactment of the Social Security Act
which, when juxtaposed against its radical opposition, recharacterizes
unemployment compensation as a conservative or privatized form of
social wage. Section III examines the process ofjudicial retrenchment
through narrowing interpretations of the doctrinal criteria for eligibility for and disqualification from receiving unemployment benefits.
This judicial contraction of access to unemployment benefits was accomplished by recharacterizing the original social wage conception of
unemployment insurance first, as a public welfare insurance program
to combat destitution and, second, as a tool of fiscal stabilization. The
resulting doctrinal argument integrates unemployment insurance policy with the ideological assumptions which underlie the law of employment relations generally. Safely masked, this legal discourse ignores the
connection between unemployment insurance, labor reserve needs
and labor force deskilling. It also creates a relationship of dependency
between the worker and the state which allows the cost of labor market
rationalization to be imposed on individual workers. Thus disappears
a legal regime of unemployment insurance based on alternative visions
of the social order which might have prevailed, and indeed in some
sense was deployed effectively to force change in an accepted legal
regime of privatized wage contracts. Section IV concludes with a call
to incorporate the meaning of social contest in the practices constructing legal meaning. The rediscovery of the history of America's version
of the social wage challenges both the legitimacy of accepted legal
argument and the beneficiaries of the traditional model of legal practice. This history reveals the injustice of failing to incorporate a socially
informed historical method in such practice.

10 See

generally Leon Fink, American Labor History, in

THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY

233,

243-44 (Eric Foner ed., 1990) for a discussion of the decentralized nature of American labor
unions.
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STRUGGLE: THE WORKERS' UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BILL

[O]ur economic condition as workers, and especially as Building
Trades workers has steadally [sic] grown worse. We have had
practically no work forfive years, being unable to meet the interest
of our mortgages, and ofpaying taxes, a greatmany have lost their
homes and a lifetime savings ....
Having analized [sic] the different proposalsfor unemployment
insurancerecommended to become law, wefind in many cases that
recommendation for setup of such laws are based on principles
which will not increase buying power nor give any relief to the
unemployed for some time to come.
Only one plan or recommendation endorsed by ourLabor Unions
in the States is worthy of enactment to become law. I refer to
HR 2827 known as [the Lundeen] Bill ....
Letter to Senator Robert Wagner, January 23, 193511
We indorsed the Frazier-LundeenBill not because we are Communist, which we are not, but on the merits of the Bill itself as we see
a lot of good in the Bill providing we could get it enacted into law
.... What difference does it make who indorses a Bill so long as
it is in favor of the working people?
Letter to President William Green, American Federation of
Labor, January 16, 193712
Unemployment remains the defining experience of the Depression, searing the fear of loss ofjob and livelihood into the psychology
of a people:
This experience is only too familiar to millions of men and
women who work in mills, mines, factories and shops, depending on their daily wage for livelihood and for support of
their families. The lives of these people are governed by the
fear of losing their job. Eleven million others are no longer
haunted by this constant fear-they have no work; and there
is no assurance that there will be work for them soon. To
survive they must depend on public relief or charity and they
1Letter from Robert Larson, Secretary and Business Agent, United Brotherhood of Carpenters andJoiners of America Local 66,Jamestown, NYto Senator Robert F Wagner (Jan. 23, 1935)
(on file with Wagner Papers, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University).
12 Letter fromJames 0. Cox, H.N. Cassell and E.H. Helterbraun, Yellowstone County Trades
and Labor Assembly, Billings, Mont., to William Green, President, AFL (Jan. 16, 1935) (on file
with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring,
Md.).
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know that these cannot last long. For them fear has given way
13
to hopeless despair.
The Depression's meaning now, however, is often reconstructed
differently. Changes in the law and the state which are associated
with crises are more prominently remembered. Today, unemployment insurance is variously miscast as a cog in Keynesian governmental interventions to prop up consumer demand, 14 a plank in a
Democratic Party platform forging an urban liberal coalition, 15 a
minor character in Social Security enacted as a response to middle
class reformers and bureaucratic building of the Welfare State, 6 or
a progressive business sop to buttress the structural dislocations of
capitalist technology.17 Battles over the legislative details of unemployment insurance appear to have been waged solely by professional, academic and political elites in orderly conferences and
hearing rooms. Absent are the voices and politics of those millions
in fear and in pain. This account rediscovers rank and file struggle
for an alternative legal approach, one which was foregone, but was
nonetheless present, politically plausible, and contemporaneously
of considerable consequence. 18 In this section, the politics of a rank
13Economic Securityfor the Worker, 42 AM. FEDERATIoNisT 254, 254 (1935).
14 See MARGARET WEIR, The Federal Government and Unemployment: The Frustrationof Policy
Innovationfrom the New Deal to the Great Society, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 149, 150 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
15 Seegenera/yJ.JosEPHHUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN
LIBERALISM 80-83 (1968) (discussing urban liberalism and unemployment insurance).
16 SeegenerallyPAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1936) (discussing
unemployment insurance as component of social security).
17 See generally FRANCIS F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
8
1 The story is thus a small picture of how structure and culture meet in the process of the

state as it both reflects and shapes the organization of work. The argument follows the labor
history of David Montgomery, expanding worker's politics from shop floor control to the social
consequences of economic, social and technological change. See generally DAVID MONTGOMERY,
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR (1987) for a discussion of labor activism in the United States.
The argument also follows the legal history of E.P. Thompson, emphasizing the contingency of
legal and political content upon conscious, continuous and pervasive mass-based social activity
and conflict. See generally THOMPSON, supranote 7, at 258-69; E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF
THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963). The account expands on William Forbath's description of
the legal form of American exceptionalism which existed before the 1930s. SeeWilliam E. Forbath,

The Shapingof the American LaborMovement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989); see alsoJoel Rogers,
Divide and Conquer:Further"Reflections on the Distinctive CharacterofAmerican LaborLaws," 1990
WIs. L. REv. 1 (1990) (discussing postwar exceptionalism). Agreeing with Forbath that exceptionalism did not mean the absence of a distinct labor politics, the account shows how the content
of organized labor's politics formed in response to rank and file and unorganized worker
pressures, not merely in response to an antagonistic state. Agreeing with Rogers that the structure
of labor law built through World War II created the conditions for a rational politics of organi-
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and file workers' movement first will be placed in the historic
context of the labor movement's political response to the issues of
economic security: a view consistent with organized labor's voluntaristic stance toward government policy generally. The second part
of this section demonstrates the salience of unemployment insurance as an issue which divided organized labor, pitting crafts against
mass production industrial lines. The third part documents the
political influence of the movement, and the fourth shows how the
decision to forego the social wage alternative on unemployment
insurance was consistent with parallel determinations in enacting
the law of collective bargaining. 19
The fight for the Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance
Bill thus becomes a component of the contingent political construction of a particular type of social wage consciousness-our own. Deceptively simple in its two guiding principles, the bill provided a minimum standard of benefits of indefinite duration for full or partial
involuntary unemployment. These benefits were to be administered
through European style workers' councils.
The Workers' Bill was not the only proposed alternative for unemployment insurance on the political agenda in the early 1930s, but
it was structurally and ideologically both the most radical and the most
different. Table 1 provides a comparison of key elements found in
several of the alternatives. Ultimately, it was also the most influential
of the foregone alternatives in shaping unemployment insurance as
20
part of social security.

The fight for passage of the Workers' Bill encompasses many
tangled narratives. It is the story of a rank and file movement which
gained endorsement from union locals representing over a million
members, and pushed conservative union leaders in the American
Federation of Labor (the "AFL") to formulate an economic security
zation which ensured the weakness of labor organization as a political force, the account holds
that this was not an inevitable outcome. First, this structure developed at least in part by virtue
of a distinct politics internal to organized labor during the early New Deal. Second, worker politics
during the Depression found voices other than unions and causes other than the organization
and control of work.
19 See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw
111-80 (1983) (discussing enactment of collective bargaining laws).
20
The political history of the Social Security Act represents much more than that presented
here. Other groups and interests contributed to the outcome. That history is for others to write.
My interest is in the role of workers in contestation of power and the subtle repression of social
democracy through discursive practices such as law and history. I trust urban liberals, middle
class reformers, Keynesian economists, et al. to read the dialectics (plural) or history and defend
themselves.
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response. It is the story of the progress in Congress of the bill proposed
by Farmer Labor Congressman Ernest Lundeen, which came closer to
becoming law than any other predecessor to Social Security. It is the
story of an incipient social movement which connected significant
radical activists who otherwise were never linked personally or through
their organizations. These included Lundeen himself, labor leaders
Harry Bridges and Mother Bloor, social reformer Mary Van Kleeck,
Communist Party organizer Herbert Benjamin and Urban League officer
T. Arnold Hill.
The process of recovering the voice of the rank and file reconstructs the familiar description of American exceptionalism-the lack
of a labor or social-democratic party. Indeed, organized labor's earlier
antagonism to the state, and its later alliance with a pluralistic centrist
party, frame what is particular about American worker politics.

21

Facing

individual hardships and horrors like those of the depression, workers
often demanded the resources to protect family and home in social
wage terms. In the instance of unemployment insurance, we should
not assume that their voices were not heard, dialectically at least,
merely because they could not ultimately succeed against organization,
including their own unions.
A. AFL Voluntatism and the Rank and File
The story begins in the classic anti-state ideology of craft-based
labor organization under AFL President Samuel Gompers. Because
capital managers naturally obtain work through contract at the lowest
possible wage, organization by crafts created the maximum possible
holdout leverage for organized employees. Elite and skilled workers
could control not only the terms of their work but also the return on
their contribution. Any government interference with the gains derived from withholding labor either limited the economic weapon or
sapped the workers' will to use it. Moreover, because skills defined
scarcity, sufficient return could be extracted to protect pooling against
risks such as the loss of one's job.
Until his death, Gompers believed that the state by inclination and
inevitable effect would reduce workers' standards of living and therefore their very freedom. At Gompers' last convention in 1924, AFL Vice
President William Green read for him a final presidential address and
plea to honor his memory, "in a spirit of consecration to the cause of
21

See

generally AMERICAN

LABOR RADICALISM:

TESTIMONIES

AND INTERPRETATIONS

(Staughton Lynd ed., 1973) for a discussion of American worker politics.
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humanity... to urge devotion to the fundamentals of human libertythe principle of voluntarism." 22 The eligibility requirements of unemployment insurance would make the means for sustaining life, and thus
liberty, dependent on government supervision of the conditions of leaving employment, often in partnership with a coercive employer's leverage over employment terms. '"The whole of activity to organize, to
assert and to live our own lives would be subject to every petty or high
official... according to the government's conception of what is and
what is not voluntary unemployment. '23 At the 1921 AFL convention,
President Gompers had called unemployment insurance "not insurance against unemployment" but "compensation for lack of employment. 24 Insurance against unemployment would be better achieved by
translating increased productivity into the same pay for shorter hours.
If necessary, workers would share hours if productivity could not support full employment of the relevant skilled labor force.
Shorter hours for the same pay would increase usable time for all
and increase consumption by the greater number hired. For a worker,
more leisure meant the "most valuable thing in life-time to read, time
to cultivate the best that is in him, in his wife and in his children; to
cultivate better tastes so that the luxuries become the necessaries of
life tomorrow."25 Writing to John O'Hanlon, then Chairman of the
Legislative Committee, later President of the New York Federation of
Labor, Gompers called a State Assembly Bill "a very clever device to
reduce wages" which "should be opposed with all the vigor of the
representatives of the New York State Federation of Labor and the
entire labor movement of New York." 26 With compulsory insurance,
employers in a non-union shop could, under a threat of discharge,
unilaterally reduce wages to pay for premiums. It was also a device, like
company unions or relief societies, to inhibit autonomous organization.
During the 1920s, under conditions of increased productivity
brought about through Taylorist work management, swollen profits
accompanied lower levels of compensation and employment. Thus,
even the most extensive union unemployment benefits, such as those
22

AMERICAN FED'N OF LABOR, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 44TH CONVENTION OF THE

AFL 235 (1924).

AMERICAN FED'N OF LABOR, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST CONVENTION OF THE

AFL 24376-77 (1921).
Id at 377.

2Id.
26

Letter from Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, toJ. O'Hanlon (Mar. 7, 1924) (on file with
Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).
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of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America under Sidney Hillman, could not survive the combination of benefit demands and loss
of dues consequent to the increasing unemployment of union members. 27 Yet, Gompers' successor, William Green, often made it appear
as if Gompers' full theory of voluntarism continued.
In fact, during Green's administration, both the context and direction of anti-statism changed significantly, even as AFL policy changes
could still be reconciled with a re-tooled voluntarism.2 8 As of 1930 and
1931, the AFL and President Green were still clearly opposed to unemployment insurance, even as they supported some governmental
efforts to ease joblessness through the formation of a national employment service, statistical studies of the problem, and increased public
employment. In August of 1930, Green unflinchingly wrote, 'The A.F.
of L. has never prepared an unemployment insurance bill."29 At the
September quarterly meeting of the Executive Council, Green announced a public platform of voluntary agreements between employers and workers in seasonal industries for setting up insurance funds,
the dividing of available work through shorter workdays and weeks,
and stabilization of production to guarantee the worker a regular
yearly wage. The Council actively opposed compulsory unemployment
insurance. As late as February of 1931, Green still resembled Gompers
in his insistence that the American worker would not willingly submit
to the domination and control of the state as did British and Continental workers. "WNe do not want to destroy our economic movement
through the substitution of force and state domination growing out of
the enactment of hasty and ill-considered legislation." 30 Green even
asserted that unemployment was unnecessary. "If industry had paid
wages corresponding with the increasing power of individual and collective production, working people would have bought the things which
industry produced and thus we would have employment ....

31

Finally,

Green retreated to bedrock: 'The basis of all improvement in our
27

See

generally MATrHEV

JOSEPHSON, SIDNEY HILLMAN: STATESMAN OF AMERICAN LABOR

252-55 (1952) (on Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and unemployment insurance).
28
For a critical analysis of AFL unions in the 1930s, see generally Christopher L. Tomlins,

AFL 29Unions in the 1930s: Their Performancein HistoricalPerspectiv 65J. AM.

HIST.

1021 (1979).

Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to M. Reiss (Aug. 29, 1930) (on file with AFL
Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis.).
30 Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to Charles W. Anderson, Secretary, City and
County Employees Joint Council, Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb. 17, 1931) (on file with Papers of the
Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).
31Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to John M. Gancz, Secretary, Lodge 7, International Ass'n of Machinists (Feb. 19, 1931) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President,
AFL, supranote 12).
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economic and social well being is found in the growth, strength and
expansion of organized labor. Unemployment plans suggested by some
well-meaning people would, if put into effect, effectively destroy the
organized labor movement." 32 But by July of 1932, Green was reporting
to Senator Robert Wagner: "At the July meeting of the Executive
Council I was instructed to draft a plan for unemployment reserves...
relief had become so imperative an issue that we ought to consider
33
legislative means for providing stable incomes for wage earners."
The 1931 Convention of the AFL was pivotal to a more subtly
evolving voluntarism. The previous year, meeting in Boston, the Executive Council grudgingly had agreed to be instructed to study the
problem of unemployment and various proposals for solutions, including insurance. But the Council had also vigorously reasserted its commitment to voluntarism, questioning "whether the American Federation of Labor shall continue to hew to the line in demanding a greater
freedom for the working people of America, or whether liberty shall
be sacrificed in a degree sufficient to enable the workers to obtain a
small measure of unemployment relief under government supervision
and control." 4 The Executive Council report to the 1931 Vancouver
Convention ignored insurance. An emergency program demanded
wage maintenance, shorter hours, the addition of workers by each
employer, public building, employment agencies, preference for workers with dependents, and financial relief from public funds.35 The
long-term program called for employment stabilization through corporatist national planning, which would include organized labor as a
partner and was aimed at balancing work time and wages with productivity increases so that "workers shall share in industrial progress by
advances in real wages and greater leisure." 36 The program also called
for the recognition of workers' equity in their jobs. 37 In short, the
leadership wanted to preserve the voluntarist approach to the individual's unemployment or under-employment. This would maintain the
twin goals of private control over benefits as a necessary tool of organization strategy and economic leverage over real wealth to improve
living conditions. At the same time, a pro-state policy was necessary to
32

1L

33

Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to Senator Robert Wagner (July 28, 1932) (on
file with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).
34AMEmJcAN FED'N OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST CONVENTION OF
THE AFL 369 (1931).
35Id at 17.
3
6Id
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stabilize macro-economic conditions, and, as an adjunct to planning,
state power to stand behind increased labor organization and rationalization.
However, Labor's proto-partnership with business and state for
stabilized growth required that, as quid pro quo for cooperation, business supply job security and improve living standards. Instead, an
ambivalent capitalist class retained increased profits while preempting
the necessary countervailing labor organization by undermining organizing strategies. "Firms are establishing benefit features paid for by
low wages and working conditions imposed on the workers. These
methods are making it very difficult for our organizations to organize
their employes [sic]. 138
Pushed by political events, the AFL developed its proposals by
concession. The Council continued its reactive stance in the August
1931 meeting. Green believed the call for relief was simply diverting
attention from the Federation's approach of increasing jobs and sharing work, although Vice President Wharton concluded that divided
work meant earnings so far reduced that they would not enable workers to make a living wage:
Failure of industrial management to provide and maintain
work opportunities through the distribution of the amount
of work available upon a nation-wide basis is resulting in the
crystallization of public opinion in support of Unemployment
Insurance legislation .... The American Federation of Labor
wishes very sincerely that the enactment of such legislation
could be avoided. It prefers work and the creation of work
opportunities to the payment of relief to those who are idle
but men, women and children must not suffer from hunger
and want merely because willing workers are deprived of an
opportunity to work.39
Minutes of AFL Executive Council meetings show that the Council
gave little time, and then only grudgingly, to substantive discussion
of proposals to deal with unemployment. 40 As the AFL Labor Day
message in 1932, which followed the Council's decision to endorse
38AFL Executive Council Minutes 82 (Sept. 1930) (on file with Papers of the Office of the
President, AFL, supranote 12).
39William Green, Labor Day Address, AFL, Official Information and Publicity Service 5
(Sept. 5, 1932) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supranote 12).
40Milton Farber, Changing Attitudes of the American Federation of Labor Toward Business
and Government, 1929-33 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (dem-
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insurance, shows, the leadership's heart and mind still lay elsewhere:
Hunger begets desperation and want transforms a rational,
normal citizen into an irrational advocate of impracticable
and unworkable remedies for all our social ills ....
For this reason the workers everywhere are able to enter
into the spirit of Labor Day fully conscious of the fact that the
foundations upon which the structure of Organized Labor
has been erected remain solid, sound and unimpaired; that
the value of the Trade Union movement, as a defensive as
well as an aggressive force, has been increasingly demonstrated and that the protecting force of our great economic
movement is as necessary during the days of adversity as it is
41
during the days of prosperity.
In stark contrast, after 1931 the minutes record considerable attention by the Council to the Communist source of rank and file
proposals for the Workers' Bill.
Here was a more general opening for labor movement members
to voice their alternatives to conservative action by the leadership. A.J.
Muste, the Chairman of the Conference for Progressive Labor Action,
and also International Vice President of the American Federation of
Teachers (the "AFT"), pushed an independent socialist proposal for
an annual wage and government unemployment reserves in 1930. This
approach was reintroduced in 1931 by AFT delegate Florence Hanson
as Resolution 90, in lieu of which the Executive Council's proposal was
passed. More directly active within the Federation, however, were rank
and file elements whose proposals eventually coalesced under the
banner of the Worker's Bill for Unemployment and Social Insurance.
On December 7, 1931, the National Hunger March, organized by
the Unemployed Councils under Herbert Benjamin, climaxed with the
presentation of the earliest version of the Workers' Bill to Congress.
This "bill" was in the form of five demands: 1) a federal system of
unemployment insurance to be immediately adopted guaranteeing full
wages for full or partial involuntary unemployment; 2) the availability
of benefits under this system to all categories of wage labor without
discrimination by race, sex, age, origin or political opinion (no person
onstrates how little of Executive Council's deliberations concerned topics or substance of change
from41voluntarism to government partnership).
Green, supra note 39, at 2.
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to be deprived of benefits for refusing to take the place of a striker or
to work for less than union rates); 3) full funding from war preparation
appropriations combined with sharply progressive taxation on all incomes over $5000, with no levies on workers; 4) administration by
elected worker committees and 5) social insurance for loss of wages
through sickness, accident, old age or maternity.42
On December 3, 1931, the National Civic Federation (the "NCF"),
then under the leadership of one of the staunchest of the AFL's
traditional voluntarists, Third Vice President Matthew Woll, warned the
Washington police chief that the Hunger March was designed only to
exploit the unemployed:
Their great 'propaganda slogan' is Unemployment Insurance
which they, themselves, state in the resolutions of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party "has the greatest revolutionary significance at the present time" . . . . They are
purposely made so extreme that they could not possibly be
entertained by any sane body of Americans.... They do not
expect to produce any revolution in the United States by this
"March" at this time, although a little later, when the cold and
hunger become more acute, they would have some hope of
43

it.

The NCF's Acting President, Matthew Woll, noted on March 2,
1931, that "American labor's only spokesmen, the American Federation of Labor and the Railway Brotherhoods, have thus far declared
themselves against [Unemployment Insurance]."44

As Chair of the Resolutions Committee and thus of floor debates
at the 1931 AFL Convention, Woll had attempted to shield the Executive Council's Report and program against the incursion of rank and
file resolutions. 45 Nevertheless, the charged atmosphere of the debates
42

See Letter from A.W. Mills, Organizer, Unemployed Councils Committee for the National
Hunger March, to Senator RobertWagner (Dec. 3, 1931) (on file with Wagner Papers, supranote
11). For further discussion of the Unemployed Councils, see generally Daniel J. Leab, "United

We Eat": The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930, 8 LAB. HIST. 300
(1967); Roy Rosenzweig, Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression:
1929-1933, in WoRKER' STRUGGLES, PAST AND PRESENT 168, 170-77 (James Green ed., 1983).
43 Letter from Ralph M. Easley, Chairman Executive Council, National Civic Federation, to
Brigadier General Pelham D. Glassford, Superintendent and Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.,
at 2 (on file with Wagner Papers, supra note 11).
44
Matthew Woll, Recent Important Activities and Plans for Future Work, National Civic
Federation (Mar. 2, 1931) (draft address) (on file with author).
45
See generally PHILIP TAFT, THE AFL FROM THE DEATH OF GOMPERS TO THE MERGER 33
(1959) (AFL Executive Council position on unemployment insurance at 1931 AFL convention).
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inevitably connected industrial organizing and economic conditions.
Delegate Duncan of the Seattle Central Labor Council challenged the
efficacy of the leadership's organizing strategy, amending the Executive Council's report to force the AFL to commit itself to unemployment relief:
I want men to get the sustenance from somewhere so that
they can stand up like real men and say, "No, I am getting
enough to get by on, I don't have to undermine my fellows,
I will stick to my unemployment insurance until I can go to
46
work with my fellows and maintain my self respect.
The relationship between unemployment and the more fungible
jobs of industrial workers made the ability of workers to remain
outside the labor pool more important to organizing and later to
protecting their strikes. This would become crucial to the unions
which would later form the Committee on Industrial Organization
(the "CIO"), such as the Textile Workers and the United Mine
Workers (the "UMW"). The Typographers' Charles Howard, a CIO
founder whose philosophy of unionism was an uneasy fit with the
CIO, objected sympathetically that workers could predict that capital would use superior political power to force the tax burden onto
employees. Moreover, he could not imagine disbursement being
turned over to trade unions. Conservative Andrew Furuseth, President of the Seamen, lamented the impact of state interventions
such as the infamous state and federal court use of injunctions on
the strength of union self-protection through economic power, but
sharply repudiated Duncan in an anti-industrial echo which equated
industrial government with revolution: "I certainly do feel that the
proposals, innocently but in fact, are transmitted in some way from
those who are planning the destruction of existing governments
and establishing an industrial government in its place. '47 But Delegate Hunter of the UMW responded by detailing both the number
of miners unemployed and the impact on union power: "It means
that the coal operators take advantage of that situation to break
down the conditions of the men who are working in the mines.
They know they can get plenty of men and they impose conditions
upon the miners that are almost unbearable." 48 Hunter estimated
that ninety percent of the miners favored unemployment insurance.
46

AMERICAN FED'N
47 Id at 378.
48
Id. at 383.

OF LABOR, supra note

34, at 374.
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Vice President Olander, who would succeed Woll on Resolutions,
appealed that liberty not be sacrificed to some hunger. Seemingly
forced to intervene, President Green acknowledged the need for
government to aid the destitute, but pleaded with the Convention
not to commit itself to insurance "which involves very fundamental
principles, principles upon which our great union rests. [Insurance
risked voluntarism, because] [y] ou must report, you must subject
yourself in every way-to the control of the law."49
Workers who were frustrated by their leaders formed a natural
constituency and a perfect political and economic opening for the
Communists. At this point, however, affiliations blurred. On January
27, 1932, Carpenters Local 2717 called a conference of eighteen New
York locals to establish the New York A.F. of L. Trade Union Committee
for Unemployment Insurance and Relief. Louis Weinstock, a painter
who became unemployed as a result of the Depression, was named its
secretary. 0 While members of other groups of unemployed such as the
Workers Alliance (Muste), Unemployed Councils (Benjamin), and the
International Workers Order (benefit society) 5' all worked together,
Weinstock later recalled the new Committee's sense of the importance
of establishing an independent group consisting only of union members within the AFL. In its first pamphlet, the New York Committee
explained that its purpose was to initiate a rank and file referendum
which would repudiate the 1931 AFL Vancouver Convention's rejection of unemployment insurance and its betrayal of twelve million
unemployed workers: 'The standard of living of the American workers
must be maintained. Breadlines and starvation must be done away
with. Unemployment Insurance is a life necessity for the American
workers. 5 2 The Committee itself claimed to have proposed the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill,53 although it was in draft identical
to the Hunger Marchers' wish list. Condemning voluntarist arguments
49

Id. at 396, 397.

S°Weinstock was later Secretary Treasurer of his Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers
local. He was one of the second group of fourteen indicted in New York under the Smith Act.
According to Weinstock, the indictment read, "on or about April 1950, Louis Weinstock, a
defendant herein, did teach at the Jefferson School of Social Science New York, N.Y a course on
labor history." Oral History of Louis Weinstock 24 (Deborah Bernhardt ed.) (on file with
Tamiment Library, New York University).
51 For a discussion of the International Workers Order, see generally Roger Keeran, The
International
Workers Orderand the Origin of the (fO, 30 LAB. HIsT. 385 (1989).
52
NEiw YORK A.F. OF L. TRADE UNION COMMITTEE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND
(1932).
3 See Unenployment Insurance: Hearingson H.R. 7598 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) (statement of Herbert Benjamin).
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as against workers' interests, the Committee attacked Green, Woll and
company:
These fakers dare to speak about the pride of the workers, at
a time when with the loyal assistance of the A.F. of L. officialdom, the bosses have reduced millions of American workers
to bread lines and flop houses .... They have the effrontery
to say that it is the workers who do not want Unemployment
54
Insurance.
Pressure on the AFL leadership indeed mounted. In the February
1932 Executive Council meeting, President Green had worried:
The call from the mining sections of the country is terrific
....
Now, what are we to do? How are these workers to
express themselves except through the American Federation
of Labor? They are calling for relief .... My position at the
convention had nothing to do with the relief of the hungry;
compulsory unemployment insurance was a union wrecking
agency. I do not know what we can do when the people are
55
hungry
Yet as late as July 2, 1932, Green wrote in the AFL Weekly News
Service, "Labor abhors unemployment insurance. Unemployment
can be prevented by making the work week and the work day short
enough so that all workers shall be employed in the future."56 At the
July meeting, Vice President Duffy of the Carpenters called attention to a communication from the Chicago District Council of
Carpenters which called for the AFL to formulate an acceptable
insurance plan. In response, President Green acknowledged local
pressures. He pointed out that he had:
submitted to the Council the information in regard to the
formation of the Communist movement in New York, known
as the New York A.F. of L. Trade Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance and Relief. A number of our organizations, through a misunderstanding, became associated with
it. They are in favor of a plan for unemployment insurance.
We may have to face the situation some way and make a
54

WHY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE?, supra note 52, at 7.
55AFL Executive Council Minutes, 34-36 (1932) (AFL Papers, supra note 29).
6
s William Green, AFL Weekly News Service (on file with Papers of the Office of the President,
AFL, supra note 12).

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

March 1994]

definite declaration because of the growing demand to do
57

something.

On October 18, 1932, just before the Cincinnati Convention, the
Council worried about the New York Committee's intention to
enter the convention hall by force of numbers and "create whatever
disorder they can while there. Their demand is for unemployment
insurance." 8 The Council decided to warn all internationals about
the dangers of locals supporting the "Communist conference." 59
On July 22, 1932, the AFL's Executive Council had a change of
heart, and decided to support an unemployment reserves plan financed
by wage deductions. Subsequently, the New York Committee issued a
second pamphlet which called for a rank and file convention to be
held in Cincinnati concurrent with the AFL convention. The pamphlet
linked unemployed AFL members, who had been rebuffed by Green
during the Hunger March, with unhappy locals as the genesis of the
January 27th Carpenter's meeting. 60 Simultaneously with the AFL convention, 250 rank and file delegates from across the country met in
Cincinnati's Carpenters Hall. A delegation of twenty-five people was
sent to the AFL to seek floor access to press their demand for unemployment insurance. Upon discovering that the AFL was using a nonunion hotel, the rank and file used 100 pickets around the hotel before
attempting to present their delegation's credentials, which were refused. Picketers and delegates then entered the hall's public balcony.
In order to present their demands for unemployment insurance, Weinstock climbed on a large chandelier and shouted out his message.
The Cincinnati afternoon paper bore the headline "Rump Convention
Disrupts A.F. of L. Convention." That evening's mass meeting at Carpenters Hall featured Walter Frank of the Minneapolis Building Trades
Council, a close friend of Congressman Lundeen who would later
61
introduce the Bill.
At the AFL convention itself, unions organized on industry lines
led the push for action on unemployment relief. Citing introduction
of machine technology, the 57th Convention of the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers called for AFL pressure on
Congress. Decrying the hardship of increasing and permanent unem57
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ployment, the 32nd Convention of the United Mine Workers did the
same, and provided their own extensive study of insurance, under the
names of John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, and Thomas Kennedy, with
legal assistance from general counsel Henry Warrum. The UMW report began tellingly:
Independent occupation no longer furnishes a livelihood to
the great industrial masses .... [I]f this economic structure
determines the dependency of labor, it must also bear the
obligation of providing employment for labor or caring for it
while unemployed.... The unemployed labor reserves upon
which industry thus relies, constitutes ajust item of industrial
cost.

62

The UMW leaders directly attacked the AFL leaders' fear that employers would have no incentive to stabilize production. They argued that full employment or its equivalent maintained living standards, while increased purchasing power accelerated the demand
necessary to business growth. The report concluded pointedly:
It seems foolish to say that unemployment insurance will
operate against the organized labor movement. The great
purpose of union labor is to bring to all our workers the
American standard of wages and working conditions ....
The pressure of [the unemployed] forjobs, coupled with the
fear of many of those employed that they may lose their jobs,
constitute the real barrier to the organization of all industrial
workers. 63

Thomas F. McMahon, President of the United Textile Workers, went
so far as to introduce a resolution for insurance which would be
financed by the state and employers and be administered in part by
committees which would include labor representation. In response,
old line delegates Andrew Furuseth, President of the Seamen, and
John P. Frey, of the Metal Trades Department, could only lament
the passing of Gompers style voluntarism:
We did not go to the unorganized who were suffering from
industrial injustice and tell them, "if you join our union we
will secure certain legislation for you." We believe that we
62
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have to do something which would impress the non-unionists
with the necessity for a vigorous, virile, militant organization
in the economic field.6
President Green finally closed the debate by invoking the escape
clause of the Vancouver Convention-business neglect will force us
to support insurance-insisting that any insurance protect the right
and incentive to belong to a union.
Although the 1932 Convention voted to support a historic change
in direction, incredibly, the minutes of the Executive Council for 1933
include no discussion of unemployment insurance. Meanwhile, the
rank and file organization, dropping New York from its title, called for
another convention to be held concurrently with the 1933 AFL meeting in Washington. At this Second Annual Rank and File Conference,
Frank Mozer of Philadelphia Plumbers Union 690 was elected President, and Louis Weinstock was reelected Secretary-Treasurer. The agenda
of the organization was broadened to encompass a range of rank and
file issues including racketeering, exemption of unemployed dues,
injunctions and the right to strike. Dues exemptions for the unemployed were of particular relevance:
The majority of the Internationals have a definite policy for
expelling and suspending members. The incomes of the Internationals have declined considerably during the crisis, and
by expelling members from the organization, the funds tied
up in the sick and death benefits are put into65 organization
funds, to be used for paying the high salaries.
The Committee issued a third pamphlet concerned with organized labor's complicity with Roosevelt's National Recovery Act (the
"NRA"), seeing too little too late in the AFL convention decision to
begin chartering federal unions:
Progressive elements in the A.F. of L. unions have long advocated industrial unions, and opposed the system of craft trade
unions as a system that divides the forces of the workers in
the shop, job or industry and makes it easier for the employers to defeat the workers.
The A.F. of L. leaders have been strong adherents of craft
unionism. Now, however, after a wave of organization, and the
64 Id. at 342.
65AFL TRADE UNION COMMITTEE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND RELIEF, PROGRAMTHIRD ANNUAL
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fear of the employers that militant independent unions would
come, the A.F. of L. is expected to organize the workers and
66
keep them from struggling.
Once again, a delegation of twenty-five of the rank and filers
presented credentials to the AFL Convention and was rebuffed. However, R. Suny, an AFL delegate representing the Cleaners, Dyers, Spotters and Pressers, who also attended the rank and file meeting, introduced the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill on behalf of his
union as a resolution at the AFL Convention. In the brief convention
floor debate on the Worker's Bill, Thomas Kennedy of the UMW asked
if their non-concurrence meant that the Committee on Resolutions
believed Senator Wagner's alternative unemployment insurance bill
was unconstitutional. He was assured it was not. Kennedy would later
write of his more generalized skepticism: "Of course, I am aware that
some of our reactionary groups, as always is the case, have raised the
question of unconstitutionality against a national system. No worthy
cause or movement for human welfare has ever been free from such
indirect and insincere attacks." 67
While unsuccessful in its attempt to enter the AFL Convention,
the rank and file committee did get the attention of the Executive
Council. At theJanuary 1934 meeting, it agreed to receive a delegation.
Frank Mozer began by claiming the support of 1200 locals and 12 State
Federations. Mr. Coleman of Aeronautical Workers Union 18286, Buffalo, New York, challenged: "[I]f the American Federation of Labor
expects to remain as a leader of the workers it must do something and
do it now." 8 Louis Weinstock called for support of the Workers' Bill.
Mr. Kuhlman of the Painters asked that suspensions for non-dues
payment be ended, noting that the AFL had lost 400,000 members
since 1932. Mr. Stein of the Quarry Workers 70, Bangor, Maine, pointed
out that "the Federation is built on craft lines and that less than fifty
thousand are in about eight different organizations and they should
be in one. "69 Mr. Peter Paul, UMW, Girardsviile, Pennsylvania, followed
by warning that in one instance 25,000 miners marched from one town
to another demanding unemployment relief, and subsequently the
miners went out on strike. 70 The Executive Council offered no substan66AFL TRADE UNION COMMITTEE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND RELIEF, BEHIND THE
SCENES OF THE 53R
67
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69
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tive response to the specific proposal of the Workers' Bill and instead
bristled at the accusation of widespread racketeering and rigged elections. President Green concluded the meeting by raising the Constitution as a barrier to any federal legislation.
In the September 1934 Executive Council, Vice President Duffy
once again reported that many locals had "unknowingly" supported
resolutions which favored the Workers' Bill. Regarding the San Francisco Convention, he asserted:
We will have to expose them because they will have the communists in here. They had them in the Washington convention and introduced resolutions but the convention voted
them down. At some session they will probably want to storm
the hall as they did in Cincinnati and other places demanding
the right to be heard. They are not coming into the conven71
tion; they are not going to be heard.
The Council considered a recommendation of the Committee on
Resolutions which was designed to limit the danger of outside organizations introducing resolutions during the Convention and which
required advance submission and screening. The Rank and File
Committee, however, succeeded in electing fifteen delegates to the
Convention and thus was already on the inside.7 2
Resolutions in opposition to the Executive Council's nonspecific
support for state unemployment reserves were introduced in the 1934
Convention in San Francisco. Industrial unions were particularly opposed. David Dubinsky and the International Ladies GarmentWorkers'
Union (the "ILGWU") apparently missed President Green's lecture on
constitutionality:
RESOLVED that the American Federation of Labor, in Fiftyfourth Convention assembled, in the City of San Francisco,
continue unremittingly its drive for the passage of a compulsory Federal unemployment insurance law; and be it further
RESOLVED, That the administration of the insurance funds
created by this law be left to each and every industry and that
the workers in each industry have a paramount voice in its
administration.7"
71
72
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Delegates Stubbe and Johnson of Automobile Workers Federal Labor Unions introduced resolutions which attacked the adequacy of
the Wagner-Lewis Bill to establish unemployment reserves and supported the Workers' Bill as the only real unemployment insurance.
Delegate Coleman Taylor, Federal Labor Union 19311, introduced
a resolution calling for a general strike in support of the Workers'
Bill. For all this, the Council's report was adopted without floor
debate.
By its highpoint in early 1935, the AFL Trade Union Committee
had collected endorsements from three thousand locals, five international unions, six state federations-Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska and Rhode Island-and thirty-three central labor unions in cities, including Pittsburgh, San Diego, Minneapolis, St. Louis,
Albuquerque, Queens and Nassau Counties, Providence, Salt Lake City
and Milwaukee. 74 The red-baiting from President Green's office, which
had begun in 1932, intensified as the number of these endorsements
grew. In 1933, Hutcheson's Carpenters dissolved New York Carpenter's
Local 2717, the local which called the first meeting of the AFL Trade
Union Committee on Unemployment Insurance and Relief, and transferred their members to other local carpenter's unions in the city. The
same fate befell Local 1151 in Philadelphia, which had sent out a
referendum on the Workers' Bill to all carpenters' locals. 7 Hutcheson's
"despotic machine" exercised its power to quell Workers' Bill activities. 76 On August 4, 1934, when George Butler communicated the
unanimous endorsement of the Workers' Bill by Local 252 of the Oil
Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers and excoriating the deficiencies
of the Wagner Bill, Green replied, reiterating support for the WagnerLewis Bill:
I presume you are not aware of the motive behind the circulation of this [Workers'] bill among the Labor organizations
of the country. The bill was prepared by Communists, who,
as it is well known, are opposed to unemployment insurance.

74AFL COMMITTEE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND RELIEF, LABOR FIGHTS FOR SOCIAL
SEcuRY: WHY THE A.F. OF L. RANK AND FILE SUPPORTS THE WORKERS' BILL (H.R. 2827) 33-39

(1935).
75 Cf Hearingson H.R. 7598, supranote 53, at 2 (statement of Herbert Benjamin) (criticism
of AFL's efforts to obstruct local support for Workers' Bill). Benjamin stated that, "the American
Federation of Labor has not been utilized in the interests of labor." Id.
76
News From the Carpenters'Locals,A.F. OF L. RANK AND FILE FEDERATIONIST, Feb. 1934, at
7 (on file with New York City Public Library).
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They simply had introduced an impossible bill in order that
77
the real bill would be defeated.
Butler countered:
[W]e of Local 252 dont [sic] understand your motive by
branding this bill, as being prepared by communists, we read
both bills before the body, H.R. 7598, bill is a thousand times
better and suitable to [the] American laborer, than the half
baked Wagner Lewis bill, which saddles the bill on the workers pay envelope ....
Was there any cry from the American worker of communism when high finance, big business, industry, railroads,
banks, who received a governmental dole of not ten dollars
a week but millions upon millions ....
[T]ake that plug hat of reactionism and get into overalls
We are not going to beg your leadership to change your
opinion of HR 7598, bill which is ajust bill for the American
Laborer but demand you to support this bill which is not
impossible but just. 78
William Green sent letters to endorsing locals which labelled the
Workers' Bill as a ploy of the Communists; he fortified the charge by
remonstrating at the Bill's unconstitutionality. Rank and File President
Frank Mozer responded: "Some of the locals sent the letters back to
William Green, telling him that unemployment was also unconstitutional, and that Green was not doing very much to alleviate this condition."79 W.W. Britton, President-Secretary-Treasurer of the Metal Polishers International, wrote Green asking for proof that the Workers' Bill
was Communist. Britton wanted to provide such proof to members who
were angry because they were being asked to pass a local rule prohibiting the reading of AFL Committee on Unemployment Insurance and
Relief literature. Britton wrote: "I have issued an order to our local
President not to permit the discussion of this matter on the floor of
the meeting any more, and the threat of taking charge of that organi77Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to George W. Butler (Sept. 4, 1934) (on file
with Ernest Lundeen Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford University).
78Letter from George W. Butler to William Green, President, AFL (Sept. 1934) (on file with
Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
79
Proceedings-3rd Annual AFL Rank and File Conference, 20 (Oct. 1934) (on file with
Tamiment Library, supra note 50).
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zation by the International and placing our own officers in the chair
...."80 Green responded: 'The Lundeen [Workers'] bill was prepared
by the communists and is being urged by the 'Daily Worker.' the official
organ of the Soviet Government in the United States." 81 To one of the
central labor unions which had endorsed the bill, Green wrote, "House
Bill 2827 [the successor to 7598] is sent out by the communists....
No contributions should be made by any labor organization to this
group ... ."82 To the Yellowstone County Trades and Labor Assembly,
he wrote:
Some twelve years ago the Third International at Moscow,
Russia, called upon the Communists in this country to advocate unemployment insurance. It was to be used as a slogan
in the campaign to organize Communists. At the same time
it was made known that an impossible bill should be prepared
as the Committern [sic] was opposed to unemployment in83
surance.
The President of the Montana State Federation, one of the State
Federations to endorse the Workers' Bill later in 1936, wrote Green
to tell him: 'The boys were a little peeved at your letter as they took
it that you were insinuating that they were mixed up with the
communists ... ."8 In contrast, after formation of the CIO, but
before expulsion, Green treated a UMW local's endorsement more
gingerly. Louis Weinstock underlined the incredulity with which the
official AFL position was received:
In 1934, when there are 15 million people unemployed, when
the working conditions are miserable, and the living standards, are lowest in the history of the country, the workers in
the A.F. of L. who are interested to improve their working
conditions, cannot accept communications like this from the
0

8 Letter from W.W. Britton to William Green, President, AFL (Jan.16, 1935) (on filewith
Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).

81Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to W.W. Britton, at 2 (Jan.23, 1935) (on file
with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).
8

2Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to George Heath, Secretary, Kalamazoo Fed'n

of Labor (Dec. 30, 1935) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note 12).
83Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to E.H. Helterbraun, Yellowstone County
Trades and Labor Assembly (Dec. 15, 1935) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President,

AFL, supranote 12).
84Letter fromJames D. Graham, President, Montana State Fed'n of Labor, to William Green,
President, AFL (Jan. 2, 1936) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note
12).
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The rank and file in the local
A.F. of L. officialdom ....
unions cannot be scared by expulsions and suspensions.8 5
'The American Federation of Labor convention which was held last
October did not endorse any specific bill dealing with [unemployment] insurance. 8 s6 In October 1935, the Executive Council, based
on its "communist philosophy," did disapprove a resolution which
supported the Workers' Bill which had been sent to the Council for
action by the Committee on Resolutions of the 1934 Convention.
The Workers' Bill was introduced in resolutions again at the 1935
and 1936 Conventions but was not debated except for Vice President
Woll's insistence on supporting the Social Security Act with appropriate amendments. By this time, in any case, issue-by-issue conflict between craft and industrial interests had given way to all-out conflict
over the necessity that organized labor deal with the mass production
industries.
B. The CIO and the Workers' Bill
Together with Sidney Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, which had its own internal unemployment insurance plan,
four other international unions-the Miners; ILGWU; Textile Workers;
and Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers-had actively opposed the AFL
leadership program on unemployment insurance at AFL conventions
between 1932 and 1934. The Textile Workers and the Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers specifically endorsed the Workers' Bill. James Robinson, Secretary of the latter, delivered the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers' resolution: 'We believe that the final solution of the unemployment problem is the seizure of power by the workers and the
production for use instead of for profit .... ,,87 By the time John Frey
brought expulsion charges against the twelve unions of the Committee
on Industrial Organization in July of 1936, a third backer of the
Workers' Bill, the Iron Steel and Tin Workers, had joined the CIO. The
connection between industrial unions and unemployment insurance
was not entirely serendipity:
5

Louis Weinstock, Opening Address-Third Annual Rank and File Conference, supra note

65, at 10.
86 Letter from William Green, President, AFL, to Bert Graham, President, UMW Local 3506,
Russellton, Pa. (Jan. 15,1936) (on file with Papers of the Office of the President, AFL, supra note
12). 87
Letter from James Robinson, Secretary-Treasurer, International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers to William Green, President, AFL (Aug. 27, 1935) (on file with Papers of the
Office of the President, AFL, supranote 12).
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Jett Lauck, Lewis's principal adviser on broad matters of political economy, shared this view about the relationships between industrial unionism and the restructuring of the political economy... Lauck's advice to Lewis during the fateful
years of the middle thirties emphasized the need for government intervention and regulation to expand production, redistribute income, and expand mass purchasing power and
government credit. And in 1934 he broached the idea of the
88
UMW leaving the AFL to start a new labor federation.
For Lewis and the CIO, dealing with the causes of unemployment
meant also dealing with the causes of the decline of union power:
In the great mass production industries and those in which the
workers are composite mechanics, specialized and engaged upon
classes of work which do not fully qualify them for craft union
membership, industrial organization is the only solution. Continuous employment, economic security and the ability to
protect the individual worker depend upon organization upon
industrial lines.8 9
Moreover, the failure to change organization meant making conditions worse:
With great mass unemployment, people are driven to accept
low wages. The pay of union men is forced down by the
competition of those who must work for less to secure a job.
The many changes taking place in methods and materials are
undermining old ways of doing things, so that even the most
skilled worker cannot be sure that his craft will not be swept
away by new inventions.9 0
The door swung both ways. As industrial unions recognized the
problem of unemployment, so unemployed worker activists became
important to the CIO: "Many leaders of the CIO came directly out of
the unemployed movement, and it appears that many in the rank and
file had similar training."9'
8 Steve Fraser, The 'Labor Question,' in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980, at 55, 70 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
89 GHtARLEs HOWARD ET AL, CoMMITTEE FOR INDUS. ORG., Minority Report of Resolutions

Committee on Organization Policies, in 55th Convention AFL, 1935, INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM 7

(1935).
90

COMMITTEE FOR INDUS. ORG., THE CASE FOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Pun. No. 4, at

5 (Mar.
1936).
91
Rosenzweig, supra note 42, at 182.
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The connection between unemployment insurance and industrial
organization was always prominent in the minds of the organizers of
the Rank and File Committee. Louis Weinstock recalled:
[B]y 1934, we had a new country actually in the labor movement. We had the mobilizations of millions of unemployed
people, who became organized in [the] unemployment movement, who were ready to become union people. This struggle
for unemployment insurance coincided with the struggle for
organization of the unorganized into industrial unionism.
There was a struggle going on in this country way back since
[the] 1920's to change the nature of the American trade
2
union movement from craft unionism to industrial unionism.
This intent was prominent in The Rank andFileFederationist,a monthly
newspaper published from 1933 to 1935 by the AFL Trade Union
Committee for Unemployment Insurance and Relief, and edited by
Weinstock. The first issue outlined the committee's eight point
program: 1) support for the Workers' Unemployment Insurance
Bill; 2) exemption of dues for unemployed workers, who were to
remain in good standing; 3) reduction of high salaries of union
officials to the average wages in the industry; 4) a six-hour day,
five-day week without reduction in pay; 5) trade union democracy
in locals and against expulsions; 6) opposition to racketeers and
gangsterism; 7) preservation of the right to strike and opposition
to compulsory arbitration and 8) immediate conventions in all
93
Internationals where regular conventions had been postponed.
Other articles attacked William Green for supporting state unemployment legislation in an effort to sidetrack a federal program and
for supporting the NRA, which was accused of lowering wages under
industrial codes without economic justification. An article by A.
Baskoff in the sixth issue reported AFL "sabotage" of Mine strikes
and the Toledo Autolite strike, as well as disruption of the longshore
jurisdictional battle. It concluded that:
The issue of craft versus industrial unionism forms one of the
most colorful chapters of American Labor History. Sincere
farsighted progressive elements in the A.F. of L. have always
fought for Industrial Unionism.... This A.F. of L. Committee
92

Oral History of Louis Weinstock, supranote 50, at 27-28.
The FirstIssue of the Rank andFileFederationisA
A.E OF L. RANK AN FiLE
Jan. 1934, at 8 (on file with New York City Public Library).
93
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is definitely in favor of Industrial Unionism and is ready to
support the rank and file in the A.F. of L. in the fight for
94
Industrial Unionism.
In the eighth issue, Weinstock berated Green for not supporting
the West Coast strike. Joseph Ryan was quoted as saying: "Conservative union leaders sanctioned the general strike to force a showdown and terminate the activities of Harry Bridges, radical longshoreman's leader."95 The tenth issue reported on the 1934 AFL
Convention and its rank and file counterpart, which added industrial unionism and full participation for black workers to the Trade
Union Committee program. The Committee convention elected
Harry Bridges of the International Longshoremen's Association as
President, and Louis Weinstock as Secretary of the organization.
Although the role of Bridges has never been examined, the San
Francisco AFL Rank and File Committee was quite active in the 1934
general strike:
The San Francisco Bay General Strike of July 16th to 20th,
1934 brings home to all of us major and vital lessons for Labor
of "life and death" importance.
First, that to the extent we have real rank and file control,
within the unions, or in the governmental set-up for that
matter, to that extent only do we have real democracy and
social and economic security in our lives. For the unions this
is illustrated very well by the strength of rank and file control
in the I.L.A. local of San Francisco. The I.L.A. local strike
committee, together with the Joint Maritime Strike Committee of Fifty, was the spear-head of the fight against the Em96
ployers' Open-Shop, union-smashing program.
In volume two, issue five, following the 1935 AFL Convention, the
editorial attitude toward John L. Lewis shifted drastically in his favor
as a result of his celebrated punching of Carpenter's President Hutcheson
during a dispute over industrial organizing:
This palace battle is caused by two main factors-first, the
continuing impact of the six-year economic crisis upon the
94

A. Baskoff, Apostles on A.F of L. Executive Board Still Opposed to Industrial Unionism, A.F.
OF L. RANK AND FILE FEDERATIONIST,June 1934, at 5 (on file with New York City Public Library).
95
Rank and File Waged HeroicFight in Frisco,A.F. OF L. RANK AND FILE FEDERATIONIsT, Aug.
1934, at 5 (on file with New York City Public Library).
96
THE LESSONS OF THE BAY DISTRICT 1934 GENERAL STRIKE 1 (A.E OF L. RANK AND FILE
COMM-rEE OF OAKLAND, CA., 1934).
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A.F. of L. membership and the American working class as a
whole, and second, resulting from this, the growing disbelief
of the A.F. of L. membership-especially newly organized
workers in basic industries-in the honesty and ability of the
top leadership of the A.F of L. and its principal affiliated
97
unions.
The last issue of volume two, issue six, pushed for formation of a
labor party.
In 1934, the AFL Trade Union Committee, in their convention,
had already urged its membership to support the coalition known as
the National Congress on Unemployment and Social Insurance. The
Provisional Committee of the Congress included many direct and
indirect connections to the Workers' Bill, as well as numerous representatives of independent leftist unions such as the Progressive Miners,
and industrial unions such as the Auto Workers Union, the Marine
Workers Industrial Union and the Trade Union Unity League. 98 The
National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance met during January 5-7, 1935 and carried on an extensive campaign for the
Lundeen Bill.99 According to Weinstock, the union-only identity embodied in the Rank and FileFederationist"was not necessary any more,
[sic] because this was already the time when the AFL seriously considered the fight for unemployment insurance and industrial unionism,
and John L. Lewis already appeared on the scene." 10 0
97

The Crisis in the A.E ofL. Official Family, A.F. oF L. RANK AND FILE FEDERATIONIST, July
1935, at 3 (on file with New York City Public Library).
9
8See Call to a National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance (1934) (on file
with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77). Committee members included: Draftsperson Mary Van
Kleeck, Inter-Professional Ass'n for Social Ins.; Harry Bridges, International Longshoreman's
Ass'n, President AFL Trade Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance Relief ("TUCUIR");
Elmer Brown, Vice President AFL TUCUIR, later President, International Typographical Union;
Louis Weinstock, Secretary AFL TUCUIR; Endorser Max Bedacht, International Workers' Order;
Herbert Benjamin, National Unemployment Council, Chair, National Congress; Supporter Paul
Brissenden, Economics Professor, Columbia University; Supporter T. Arnold Hill, Executive
Secretary, National Urban League; EndorserJ. Stenglein, Rochester Bakers Union. See id.
9
9The times pushed past the Rank and File Committee. By late 1935, the need for the
publication had been superseded by events. By the time a trademark infringement action which
was instigated by the AFL Executive Council in the Federal Trade Commission was decided on
November 24, 1936, the newspaper had ceased publication. SeeFederal Trade Commission Order
(Nov. 24, 1936) (on file with Meany Archives, supra note 12). The FTC prohibited a New York
organization from calling itself the "A.E of L. Trade Union Committee for Unemployment
Insurance and Relief," and prohibited the use of the name "A.E of L. Rank and File Federationist." Id The organization did not have permission from the AFL to use the initials "A.F. of L." Id.
Although rank and file lobbying for the Lundeen Bill continued after passage of the Social
Security Act, the Committee itself became part of a broader social insurance movement.
100 Oral History of Louis Weinstock, supra note 50, at 30.
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C. Social Movements and the Workers' Bill in Congress
Worker politics were not, of course, limited to political organizations internal to the labor movement. From 1934 to 1937, more than
seventy municipal governments, 10 1 including the city council of Minneapolis, endorsed the Workers' Bill during its congressional lifetime
as the Lundeen Bill. Numerous local chapters of mutual benefit societies wrote Senator Robert Wagner to ask him to support the Lundeen
Bill, not all ignorant that he was the sponsor of the competing reserves
plan, the Wagner-Lewis Bill. 0 2 The Fraternal Federation for Social
Insurance claimed 25,000 members in endorsing the Workers' Bill.
Also, locals of the Workmen's Sick and Death Benefit Fund, the International Workers' Order, and the Adolph Ullman Aid Society endorsed
the Bill. Immigrant ethnic organizations, made up largely of unorganized mass production workers and their families, uniformly preferred
the Workers' Bill. The Swedish Brotherhood, the Czech Society, International Glove Workers' Union of America, The Russian Workers' Club
of Hamtramck, Michigan, the Polish Republic Society of Milwaukee,
the Yugoslav Organization of Monessen, Pennsylvania, eighteen Lithuanian organizations, the Organization of Italian Descendants of Cleveland, Ohio, and the Union and League of Romanian Societies of
America all wrote directly to Congressman Lundeen.10 3 Not surprisingly, unemployed organizations did so as well because those who had
already lost theirjobs would not be eligible for benefits under WagnerLewis. The 10,000 member United Shoe and Leather Workers Unemployed Council wrote Wagner, as did many locals of the Workers'
Unemployed Union, whose advisory board included Sidney Hillman,
10 4
David Dubinsky, David Saposs and Walter Frank.
African American workers, most of whom were unorganized industrial workers, were hit hardest by the Depression. They received the
least relief and that relief was administered on discriminatory terms:
The campaign of evictions of unemployed workers and their
families which is one of the most vicious aspects of the employers' offensive, began in the Negro quarters of the large
101Call to a National Congressfor Unemployment and Social Insurance, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR2 (National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, 1935).
102 Seevarious communications from benefit societies, ethnic organizations and unemployed
councils
to Robert Wagner (on file with Wagner Papers, supra note 11).
103 See various communications from ethnic organizations to Ernest Lundeen (on file with
Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
104 Letter from Orlie Pell, Chairman, Workers Unemployed Union of Greater NY, to Senator
Robert Wagner (Apr. 25, 1934) (on file with Wagner Papers, supra note 11).
ANCE REvIEW
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cities. Chicago papers last August reported that evictions were
taking place at the rate of 2,000 per week and those were
mostly on the South Side with its great preponderance of
Negro workers from the packing-houses and steel plants. 10 5
The principles of the Workers' Bill therefore appealed to Blacks:
There must come before the Congress of the United States,
legislation that will guarantee, for all workers regardless of
age, occupation, color, sex, or political belief, fall compensation for all loss of time occasioned by involuntary unemployment, industrial accident, and sickness. Minimum standards
must be set below which this compensation must not fall.
Costs must be placed not upon workers, but upon Government and capital; and workers must not be excluded from
administering the benefits of such a plan." 6
Blacks had reason to suspect discrimination by the states:
Such an unemployment insurance scheme has special meaning for Negro workers. The establishment of uniform benefits
regardless of race would be a step toward ending the whole
system of segregation. Uniform benefits would put the Negro
in a better position to bargain for higher wages and thus help
wages of white and
eliminate the present differential between
10 7
work.
same
the
doing
Negro workers
T. Arnold Hill drove home the contrast to the Wagner-Lewis proposal by noting that farm and domestic labor, which employed more
from all social insurance
than half the black workers, were excluded
08
plans except for the Workers' Bill.
Similarly, for the first time, women could look to benefits during
maternity:
There are in the United States 2,425,000 married women of
child-bearing age (18 to 45 years) gainfully employed in the
United States. One in every five workers is a woman, and of
these, one in every four is married .... In New York City the
105

NATIONAL HUNGER MARCH, POVERTY MIDST RICHES: WHY WE DEMAND UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 25 (Dec. 7, 1931).
106
T. Arnold Hill, The Negro's Need for Unemployment Insurance, 1935 UNEMPLOYMENT INS.

Rm.9.
108 T. Arnold Hill, Address to National Congress on Social Insurance (Jan. 5-7, 1935) (on
file with Lundeen Papers, supranote 77).
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average total maternal death rate per 1,000 births is 4.4. In
group A, which is the slum population, where there is extreme poverty and intense overcrowding, mainly a day-laborer
class, the maternal death rate per 1,000 live births is 4.9. In
group D, which is the favorably situated economical group,
which has the highest grade of living standards, who are able
to avail themselves of competent physicians and good hospitals, the maternal death rate per 1,000 live births is 3.9. The
intermediary groups show a maternal death rate between
these two extremes. Assuring an adequate family income would
greatly lessen the maternal death rate in group A .... These
figures, I think, point to a very close relation between economic security and the maternal mortality rate. The other
causative factors, such as the quality and availability of medical care, do not alter this fact.10 9
'Mother" Ella Bloor testified:
I think very few of us who are in the cities realize the poverty
that the women are suffering, especially the young women in
the farm districts, on account of not only the drought and
the usual conditions there, but especially the fact of maternity
in these isolated places .... We found in the women's section

of the unemployed congress which took place in Washington
recently, when I met with those women two or three times,
that they were especially interested in this part of the bill,
about maternity... not only the farm women, but working
women everywhere. At this caucus of women in connection
with the Congress, several single women spoke, and they said
they felt that we must have a bill such as this, which makes
no distinction between men and women in its benefits. In
other clauses of the bill it just says "workers" and "farmers";
110
it never says "male workers."
A poll of readers taken by the New York Post after printing the
contents of the Wagner-Lewis, Lundeen and Townsend Bills, reported
that out of 1391 votes cast, 1209 readers supported the Lundeen Bill,
157 the Townsend Bill, 14 the Wagner-Lewis Bill and 7 preferred no
bill at all. Of the 1073 respondents who were employed, 957 supported
109
Social Insurance: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor,
74th Gong., 2d Sess., 56-57 (1936) (statement of Dr. Emily N. Pierson).
11 Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance:Hearings on H.R. 2827 Before Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Gong., 1st Sess., 129-30 (1935) (statement of Ella Reeve Bloor).
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the Lundeen Bill, 100 the Townsend Bill, 7 the Wagner-Lewis Bill and
5 preferred none:"'
The Post calls attention to the relatively high proportion of
supporters of the Lundeen bill who are at present employed,
a noteworthy fact, indicating the growing consciousness of
the need for security among workers still able to support
themselves.
The voters, employed and unemployed, came from every
group and class ....
The Administration's Wagner-Lewis measure drew the votes
1 12
of almost exactly one in a hundred.
Neither organization nor any particular program of indoctrination
can explain this support for the Workers' Bill. As the direct pleas
written to Congressman Lundeen indicate, this was a mass movement:
The reason I am writing you is, that we Farmers [and] Industrial workers feel that you are the only Congressman and
Representative that is working for our interest. We have analyzed the Wagner-Lewis Bill [and] also [the] Townsend Bill.
But the Lundeen H.R. (2827) is the only bill that means
anything for our class .... The people all over the country
are [waking] up to the facts that the two old Political Parties
113
are owned soul, mind [and] body by the Capitalist Class.
When Congressman Ernest Lundeen, a member of the FarmerLabor Party of Minnesota1 14 and a protege of Floyd B. Olsen, introduced the Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance Act (H.R.
7598) on February 2, 1934, the only substantive difference between it
and the AFL Trade Union Committee's version was the omission of the
latter's guarantee of benefits regardless of citizenship. Both rank and
file organizer Louis Weinstock and the Workers' Bill's eventual sponsor
in Congress, Ernest Lundeen, credit Mary Van Kleeck, Director of
Industrial Research for the Russell Sage Foundation, 115 with actually
11

FinalReturns in Social InsurancePoll, N.Y. POST, Apr. 2, 1935.

112d.
13Letter from Jesse L. Keyser to Rep. Ernest Lundeen, United States House of Repre-

sentatives (on file with Lundeen Papers, supranote 77).
114
See generally RICHARD M. VALELLY, RADICALISM IN THE STATES (1989) (discussion of role
of Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota politics).
115 On Mary Van Kleeck, see generally Guy ALcHON, THE INVISIBLE HAND OF PLANNING

13-15, 142-45 (1985).
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drafting the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill. Van Kleeck remained the legislative draftsperson through its various versions until
1936. Along the way, she formed her own organization to secure its
n6
passage, the Inter-professional Association for Social Insurance.
Prior to the introduction of H.R. 7598, Lundeen kept an undated
and unsigned draft which was similar in both principle and structure
to the Van Kleeck version. The preamble of this draft began:
Congress recognizes the right of all useful members of society
to enjoy the opportunity to secure and enjoy the essentials of
life and accordingly undertakes to guarantee such opportunity to all workers who are deprived of their ordinary means
of livelihood in consequence of mass unemployment, accident, sickness, old-age, maternity or any other cause that
prevents workers from engaging in their normal wage-earn11 7
ing pursuits.
The full text of H.R. 7598 reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act
shall be known by the title 'The Workers' Unemployment and
Social Insurance Act.' ...
SEC. 2. The Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized and
directed to provide for the immediate establishment of a
system of unemployment and social insurance for the purpose of providing insurance for all workers and farmers unemployed through no fault of their own in amounts equal to
average local wages. Such insurance shall be administered by
workers and farmers and controlled by them under rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor in conformity with the purposes and provisions of this Act, through
unemployment insurance commissions composed of the rank
and file members of workers' and farmers' organizations.
1s6HarveyKlehr credits the drafting of the Workers' Bill to the CommunistParty, an assertion
based on both an interview with Herbert Benjamin and various claims of sponsorship during the
hearings on the Bill. The hearings, however, point to no draft language. Given the drafts in
Congressman Lundeen's files, his correspondence with Mary Van Kleeck, and her subsequent
control of all drafts after the initial version, it seems equally likely that while the Communists
drafted general principles, Van Kleeck authored the actual Bill. See generally HARVEY KLEHR, THE
HEYDAY OF AMERICAN CoMMUNism 284-89 (1984) (discussion of roles of communists and Mary
Van Kleeck in lobbying for unemployment insurance).
" 7 Draft, Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance Law (on file with Lundeen Papers,
supra note 77).
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Funds for such insurance shall hereafter be provided at the
expense of the Government and of employers, and it is the
sense of Congress that funds to be raised by the Government
shall be secured by taxing inheritance and gifts, and by taxing
individual and corporation incomes of $5,000 per year and
over. No tax or contribution in any form shall be levied on
workers for the purposes of this Act In no case shall the
unemployment insurance be less than $10 per week plus $3
for each dependent.
SEC. 3. The Secretary of Labor is further authorized and
directed to provide for the establishment of other forms of
social insurance in like amounts and governed by the conditions set forth in section 1 of this Act for the purpose of
paying workers and farmers insurance for loss of wages because of part-time work, sickness, accident, old age, or maternity.
SEC. 4. The benefits of this Act shall be extended to workers
and farmers without discrimination because of age, sex, race,
or color, religious or political opinion, or affiliation, whether
they be industrial, agricultural, domestic, or professional workers, for all time lost. No worker shall be disqualified for the
benefits of this Act because of refusal to work in place of
strikers, at less than normal or trade-union rates, under unsafe or unsanitary conditions, or where hours are longer than
the prevailing union standards at the particular trade and
locality, or at any unreasonable distance from home. 118
The second version of the Bill (H.R. 2827), introduced on January
3, 1935, included all the features of H.R. 7598. A draft in Lundeen's
files included a few changes: eligibility was to begin at age eighteen; a
more specific maternity provision provided disability benefits during
the eight weeks prior to and eight weeks following birth; the bill's title
was changed to 'The Workers' Unemployment, Old Age, and Social
Insurance Act;" it was to be administered by commissions whose members would be directly elected by members of workers' and farmers'
organizations, not comprised only of the rank and file; and a provision
was added to enable workers who wished to work full time but only
were able to find part-time work to receive the difference between their
earnings and the benefit standard."19
118

H.R. 7598, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
19 Draft version of H.R. 2827 (on file with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
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The mechanism for guaranteeing the social wage was more ingenious than insidious:
[W] here the benefits exceeded the prevailing wage, this differential would withdraw workers from the labor market and
by making labor more scarce would raise the wage rate until
it at least equaled [sic] the unemployment benefits. The
benefits to the unemployed could thus be used as a lever to
compel industry to pay a living wage to those who were
employed. In a sense, therefore, this proposal meant that the
benefits could be used to finance a tacit strike to make the
120
scale of benefits the scale of wages.
Instead of collecting reserves to subsidize capital by underwriting
labor pools of unemployed workers, a benefit minimum guaranteeing living standards subsidized labor by underwriting wage floors.
To illicit skills a premium would be necessary and employers would
have to contractually protect their access to those skills.
The Committee on Labor's Report which accompanied H.R. 2827
captured the distinctive feature of the Lundeen Bill's version of the
social wage. First, the Bill covered all the unemployed for the duration
of their joblessness. Second, it was funded by current taxation instead
of reserves taken from payrolls which would raise prices, lower takehome wages, and create further imbalance between funds available for
investment and money available for consumers' purchasing power.
Finally, it linked democratic administration by workers to control by
the insureds. Increased productivity whose value was not distributed to
workers in the form of increased purchasing power, and was shared by
fewer workers as the result of technological changes, meant a glut
of undemanded goods which required rebalancing of supply and
demand. Stabilizing the system of employment to allow growth in
production justified management by the national state, "creating purchasing power for the masses who must spend the money for the
necessities of life and who, in spending the money for these necessities,
will thereby remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate com21
merce."'1
Representative Lundeen firmly believed that the purpose of insurance was to provide a social wage or income security. This he contrasted to unemployment reserves as security of existing employment:
supra note 16, at 80.
H.R. REP. No. 418, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935).

12
DOUGLAS,
21
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In my opinion, the Wagner-Lewis bill is a piece of medieval
barbarism. For the fifteen million people now unemployed it
provides absolutely nothing. In no provision does it recognize
the responsibility of the federal government to provide its citizens with social security. The supporters of the bill to date
have not dared to bring it out of the committees.
In striking contrast to the lack of support for the Administration
Wagner-Lewis bill is the situation existing with reference to the
Lundeen Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance Bill H.R.
2827. In addition to having by far the greatest popular support, this
bill has made more progress in Congress than any other social
122
security measure.
Senator Wagner was less certain. He preferred his own bill, but
wrote in answer to a supporter of the Workers' Bill: "I am always
an unemployment insurance bill
ready to say that I have never seen
23
that I did not prefer to no bill."'
President Roosevelt pulled the rug from beneath the Wagner-Lewis Bill when he formed the Committee on Economic Security in 1935
in order to put old age, disability and dependent children insurance
into an omnibus social security program. While clearly a response to
the political movement being built around a social democratic demand
for a social wage, the Social Security Act was simply a collection of four
categorical assistance programs, each with a very different administrative structure and policy rationale. The Lundeen bill, however, was
already comprehensive. Nonetheless, Van Kleeck redrafted the Workers' Bill to parallel the Administration's effort more closely. Completed
on December 18, 1935, then -Senator Lundeen introduced the Lundeen-Frazier Bill as H.R. 9680. The new version, styled the Workers'
Social Insurance Act, provided both minimum and maximum benefit
levels, with compensation otherwise set at the average wage for the
occupation or district. Qualification and disqualification for voluntary
quit standards were similar to those of the Social Security Act (the
"SSA"). The Bill also provided for self-employment insurance (unlike
in the SSA, farmers and domestics were included), and set specific
standards for old age, disability and maternity (not available in the
SSA) benefits. The Bill's administrative provisions were substantially
22

1 Letter from Rep. Ernest Lundeen to "DearFriend," (Mar. 22,1935) (on file with Lundeen

Papers, supranote 77).
12

3Letter from Sen. RobertWagner, United States Senate, to T.B. Hallock, Secretary, Workers'

Unemployed Union, Local 4, New York City (May 16, 1934) (on file with Wagner Papers, supra
note 11).
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more detailed. Staff and advisors were not elected, but rather were
chosen from panels submitted by workers' organizations, and a claims
procedure system was established. Funding was to be established through
a five-billion dollar insurance fund derived from general revenues. A
lengthy Declaration of Policy established a federal need for the bill
which exceeded the capacity of individual states to address. This was
the basis for the assertion of the Bill's constitutionality:
This loss of work, involving mass unemployment, displacement of older workers and reduced opportunities for work
by qualified young workers, and other factors, is primarily due
to the operation of social and economic forces which are
beyond the control of individuals, private bodies, or individual States. Further, this loss of work means the loss of purchasing power, with the subsequent impairment of health and
well-being, and the lowering of the living standards of mil24
lions of workers and their families.
By operating through the states, the Roosevelt Administration's
Social Security Act both avoided the federalism challenge under the
Constitution and made it unnecessary to develop a social theory of the
related causes of income insecurity. Such insecurity was therefore treated
as individual misfortune. In contrast, the Workers' Bill not only tied
the needs of the aged and disabled to their economic basis, but forced
recognition of the social nature of the costs of the production system
and of the reproduction of the labor force. This in turn demanded
national action in order to maintain the economic system's health by
guaranteeing the purchasing power of all the producers of the system's
wealth-hence, the social wage: 'The Worker's Bill puts forward a new
concept of social insurance, namely that continuity of average income,
with an established minimum equal to a living standard, must be
assured through governmental action as a first change upon the economic system."'2 Van Kleeck outlined this premise, which was flatly
opposed to the individualism of voluntarism, as follows:
By the very definition of the term, therefore, individual case
treatment is excluded as a remedy, and it is recognized that
the needs created by involuntary mass unemployment are
also "mass needs" reflected in lowered standards of living
124

H.R. 9680, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
125 Mary Van Kleeck, Speech Before National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance 1 (Jan. 5-7, 1935) (on file with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
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both for the individual and the community. This suggests the
necessity for social insurance as opposed to individual insurance, and it makes necessary the integration of insurance
against "unemployment"... whether the cause of unemployment be located ...

in a general industrial depression; or

whether it be due to the recognized general hazards to security, namely, industrial accidents, sickness, maternity, and old
26
age .... social insuranceshould not be split into categories.

Politically, the Lundeen Bill could not be ignored. 127 In 1934,
hearings were held on H.R. 7598 by a sub-committee of the House
Committee on Labor, but no action was taken. The hearings did,
however, seem genuinely open to change. One Congressman, Mr.
Dunn, asked Unemployed Council head Herbert Benjamin: "[Wiould
we attack the profit-making class if we cut down the hours of labor to
5 hours, and bring the minimum wage up to a living wage, and provide
old-age pensions and workmen's insurance? Would not that attack the
profit system?"1 28 Mr. Benjamin replied, "Ifyou would; but would you?'129
To which Mr. Dunn responded, 'Weare making a big effort to do it."' 30
During the 1935 hearings on the Bill, the AFL Trade Union Committee
for Unemployment Insurance and Relief could claim the endorsement
3
of labor organizations totaling more than one million members.' '
Edmund Witte, the University of Wisconsin Professor who headed the
Staff of the President's Committee on Economic Security, made extensive notes on the bill's legislative history. He concluded, in retrospect,
that the Lundeen Bill would be used as a "scarecrow" to get action on
its own bill. 132 Witte also expected the Bill to have great influence in
33
the future.
126Mary Van Kieeck, An Outline of Principles, UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REv. 4 (1935) (on file
with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
127
Jill S. Quadagno, Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Am.Soc. REv.
632, 638-39 (1984). But see DANIEL NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1915-1935, at 203 (1969).

128 Hearingson H.R. 7598, supra note 53, at 23 (question of Rep. Matthew A. Dunn).
129
Id. (statement of Herbert Benjamin).
130Id. (response of Rep. Matthew A. Dunn).
131 Louis Weinstock, Statement Made Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Labor,
in LABOR FIGHTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (A.F. of L. Committee For Unemployment Insurance
and Relief, 1935) [hereinafter Statement Before Labor Subcommittee].
12
3 Edmund Witte Papers (on file with Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis.).
Witte bowed to received wisdom, however, in later publication: "thanks to labor's clear denunciation, the 'thunder', for this measure never became more than a tinpan disharmony, which fooled
scarcely anyone." Edmund E. Witte, Organized Labor and SocialSecurity, in LABOR AND THE NEW
DEAL 241, 255 (Milton Derber & Edwin Young eds., 1961).
133Witte Papers, supra note 132.
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Reintroduced in 1935 as H.R. 2827, the Workers' Bill received a
major boost when William Connery of Massachusetts, Chair of the
House Committee on Labor, joined the ranks of those endorsing it.134
Other congressmen had also sponsored the Workers' Bill in 1934, most
notably Emanuel Celler of New York. The Subcommittee conducting
the main hearings on H.R. 2827 in 1935 voted by a six to one margin
in favor of the Workers' Bill. On March 8, 1935, the full labor committee voted seven to six to report the bill to the floor (Chair Connery,
Subcommittee Chair Dunn, Lundeen, Lesinski, Gilder, Truax and Marcantonio cast favorable votes). The bill, however, seemed destined to
languish in the House "graveyard"--the Rules Committee. Lundeen
needed 212 votes to discharge it to the floor. An extensive campaign
during March yielded a total of 166 signers; among the most active
petition gatherers were William Connery and a young Illinois representative, Everett Dirksen. 135 In April, Lundeen tried to attach the
Workers' Bill to the Social Security Act as an amendment from the
floor. Paul Douglas treated the fifty-two votes in favor of the amendment as indicative of a lack of broad based support, but Lundeen
remained upbeat
We won a victory in bringing the Workers' Bill, H.R. 2827
before the House for a vote. On a standing vote we had
fifty-two Congressmen for the bill. If we had been given an
opportunity for full discussion on the bill, we would have had
many more votes .... We have presented the first complete
program for social insurance ever introduced. 136
During the hearings on H.R. 7598 in 1934 and on H.R. 2827 in
1935, the AFL Trade Union Committee witnesses repeatedly emphasized security against technical change in the production system. In 1934, Representative Wood of Missouri blamed the collapse
of voluntarism on technological forces:
In this country, and just about every civilized country on the
earth, up until 10 years ago there was a great spirit not only
of opposition but of resentment against the attempt to regulate wage earners' conditions by legislation, to set their hours,
1
4Letter from William Connery to Benjamin E. Waite (Jan. 7, 1935) (on file with Lundeen
Papers, supra note 77).
135 Lundeen Papers, supra note 77. Until approximately two years previously, 167 signatures
had sufficed for discharge.
16 Letter from Ernest Lundeen to Walter Frank, Secretary, Minneapolis Sponsoring Committee for Unemployment and Social Insurance, at 1 (Apr. 27, 1935) (on file with Lundeen
Papers, supra note 77).
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set their wages, and thereby set their living standards, through
the enactment of laws. In all civilized countries the labor
movement had preferred to depend upon their economic
organization to establish hours of labor and working conditions .... But with the development of machinery.., it is
necessary to enact legislation; ... the only way we can meet
the exigencies of the situation in bringing about recovery,
permanent recovery, is to limit the hours of labor by the
enactment of law, and also to regulate the minimum-wage
137
standard by the enactment of law.
The AFL leaders sought to regulate hours in order to share work
and they encouraged the growth ofjobs to hold on to voluntarism
as an organizational strategy to the fullest extent possible. "In the
labor movement, too, the private wage became an ideology. Wherever the consumer's complaint was heard on the high cost of merchandise, or wherever a complaint from the workers seemed imminent against their low wages, which made it impossible to meet the
high cost of living, or for shorter hours to counteract the monotony
of increasing mechanization of industry, one answer served to quiet
both. Increase productivity. Industrial efficiency with its elimination
of waste is the only remedy and the only salvation against all social
8
evils."13
Herbert Benjamin and the rank and file, however, wanted to
emphasize the guarantee of income as a response to the inevitable pace
of technological change and technical management. They had a different view of AFL strategy and its futility. In 1935, Secretary Louis
Weinstock began testifying by noting that 26% of the members of AFL
labor unions were totally unemployed. 139 Wage standards were falling
even faster than employment, with 1933 payrolls down 55% from 1929,
while employment was down 34.3%. 140 The concomitant pressure toward lower valued and fewer jobs forced ruthless competition to hold
on to what was left. "As a result of the excessive lay-offs, speed-up
increased in the shops.' 41 With employment dropping at the same
time that gross productivity increased, labor union membership, the
very foundation of economic self-protection, dropped sharply. Gains
of new members did nothing to protect the old members now unem137Hearingson H.R. 7598,supra note 53, at 17-18 (statement of Rep. Reuben T. Wood).
Fannia M. Cohn, Wages Should be ChargedAgainst Industry-The Only Remedy Against
Unemploymen4 42 Am. FEDERATIONIST 1236, 1237 (1935).
1 38

139 Statement Before Labor Subcommitte supra note 131, at 8.
140 111 at 9.
1411I&
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ployed. Not needed for the work, the surplus employee needed a living
standard guarantee. Legislation "must protect the standards of the
employed, it must offer security against illness and old age, and against
a condition where millions of children are under nourished and starving, where families must live in overcrowded slum firetraps and are
faced with evictions and lack of shelter...."142
Union endorsements of the bill followed the same pattern of
drawing connections to industrial unionism. The Iron, Steel and Tin
Workers endorsed the Lundeen Bill because of rising productivity and
falling employment in the industry: "This proves to us that even with
increased production, with a pick-up in steel, they will never be able
to put the steel workers back to work," argued spokesman Roy Hallas,
adding: "A large number of them are thinking of their own Labor
Party."143 F. Elmer Brown of the Typographers Union based his call for
social insurance on the inability of the craft organizations to maintain
their holdout power. Brown noted: "It is the only bill which places the
responsibility for unemployment where it belongs-upon the federal
government and the owners of the tools and natural resources of the
country."144 Confronted by scientific management and the re-division
of labor, the power of the craftsman had declined to the same level as
the production worker's. No longer able to command the surplus from
productivity increases, union members had less ability to provide selfinsurance:
For many years the printing trades unions have administered
unemployment relief, sick benefits, and old age pensions to
their members. Funds for these social features have been
collected from the membership. However, technological development, in which the workers shared but little, with other
maladjustments in our social system, have compelled the unions to either abandon these practices or curtail them to such
145
a degree as to render them almost of no value.
D. Unemployment Insurance and the Structure of Labor Law
The social democratic moral vision of the radical rank and file was
subordinated to the exigencies of organized labor's politics and the
14Id at 11.
143
Id at 20-21 (statement of Roy Hallas, President, Revival Lodge 169, Amalgamated Ass'n
of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, Clairton, Pa.).
144Statement Before Labor Subcommittee, supra note 131, at 23 (statement of . Elmer Brown).
145
Id. at 23-24.
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content of legislation. A different version of workers' politics could
have linked a social wage to the organization of mass production
industry, which might have resulted in the formation of a viable labor
party: "Even in the early years of the New Deal, when mass and general
strikes and rank-and-file self-organization made independent labor
politics and radical versions of industrial democracy seem less than
utopian, counter-currents within and outside of the labor movement
pressed toward a more conservative resolution."1 46 Similarly, recognition of a mode of collective bargaining defined more forcefully by the
full economic power of strikes, primary and secondary boycotts, and
consumer actions, a development which was later vitiated by judicial
retrenchment of the National Labor Relations Act and the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, might have expanded bargainable "conditions of work"
to include conditions of investment. This would have precluded the
separation of investment and employment decisions. Instead, Senator
Robert Wagner's collective bargaining vision succumbed to the same
legal ideology as that of a conservative AFL leadership and a later CIO
leadership: preference for unemployment reserves and industrial peace
rather than social wage, worker democracy and worker control over
production. In short, the nation settled for half a loaf.
In explaining the desirability of the Workers' Bill's social wage
approach to insurance, the Labor Committee Report relied directly on
the testimony of the Bill's draftsperson Mary Van Kleeck:
Other proposals .

.

. [serve] merely to rearrange workers'

income, decreasing current earnings in the interest of building up reserve funds against future unemployment. These
funds enter into channels of investment, which really constitute increase [sic] in the debt burden of American industry
and still further throw out of gear the purchasing power of
the people in relation to productive capacity.147
In the Workers' Bill:
Stability of the worker's dollar implies the possibility of purchasing always a suitable quantity of the necessities of life.
146 Fraser, supra note 88, at 78. On militancy and labor law, see generally James Green,
Working Class Militancy in the Depression, 6 RADICAL AM. 1 (1972); Michael Goldfield, Worker
Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal Labor Legislation, 83 AM. POL. SM. REV. 1257
(1989).
147 Unemploymen Old Age, and Social Insurance,Hearing on H.R. 2827 Before the Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1935) (statement of Mary Van Kleeck,
Chairman, Interprofessional Association for Social Insurance).
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And whether the dollar be measured in the value of metal or
in terms of a commodity, both farmers and industrial workers
must be able to count upon the stability of their income on
one hand and, on the other hand, on the stability of the
elements of the standards of living which this country makes
possible. 148
Outside the hearings, Van Kleeck further elaborated on the possibility of establishing a new legal understanding of property as use
value related to production. Such a formulation justified a guaranteed
living standard:
[G]iven so great a productive capacity that goods must be
destroyed, it is a reasonable demand that the unemployed be
given the purchasing power which, as the surplus of resources
shows, has not been paid in wages to the unemployed in
sufficient quantity to buy the goods produced. From this
point of view, unemployment insurance is a kind of deferred
wage bill. 149
Just as this meant redistributive funding, it also meant workers'
entitlement to exercise control: "As such, it is to be administered by
workers for the same reason that they control their own wages after
150
they are paid.'
The opposed ideas animating the alternative insurance proposals-that workers should control a portion of credit or investment
streams in the definition of the social wage versus the alternative of
unemployment reserves which preserve management access to investment or credit streams at the expense of privately defined wagesthrow into sharp relief the key structural provisions of American labor
law. The social wage alternative undermines the idea that the terms of
production are necessarily defined by bilateral wage agreements where
costs and risks of production and reproduction of the labor force are
voluntarily assumed. Rights are defined equally as an alternative to, or
in supervention of, contract within the relations of the state and social
organization. Worker controls over production are not limited to contract. Property in the job is established, and, concomitantly, investment
is no longer reserved to capital as a matter of contract prerogative and
property right. In contrast, a reserves plan such as the one adopted in
148
Id.at 92.

149
Mary Van Kleeck, Security for Ameicans 1V: The Workers'Billfor Unemployment and Social

Insurance, NEwvREPuBuC, Dec. 12, 1934, at 121, 123.
150
Id.
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the Social Security Act requires either direct wage reductions to pool
for future loss or indirect funding by taxes which are passed on to
worker-consumers through prices: "[A]s in the past program of the
New Deal, restoration of business is the point of attack, rather than
income, which appears to be the decisive factor in the maladjustment
151
between production and consumption."
Van Kleeck defended the constitutionality of a federal program in
proto-Keynesian terms. Increasing purchasing power would free the
flow of interstate commerce by removing gluts on the national goods
markets, a problem which individual states could not solve given the
"prisoner's dilemma" or competition problems. Thus, current unemployed workers must be protected as much as currently working but
at-risk employees.
The drafters of the other Wagner Act also originally intended to
increase and stabilize demand by making redistribution a tool of recovery. The framers of the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA")
believed that increased organization would end recognition battles and
therefore stop production loss, while increased labor power would
redistribute wealth by forcing higher wages and asserting control over
conditions of employment 152 Of course, redistribution was limited to
employees whose organization was regulated. The NLRA left virtually
the same groups unprotected as did Social Security unemployment
insurance. The National Urban League's T. Arnold Hill protested the
operation of NLRA forerunner section 7a of the National Industrial
Recovery Act:
The large number of [Negro] employees who are worked
longer hours and paid smaller wages than the regulations
dictate constitute a much more serious violation of public
trust and legal statute than do the dismissals of Negro workers
by employers who are against paying them wages equal to
those paid whites. And more serious is the failure of NRA to
153
enforce compliance, thus tacitly condoning the violation.
[Hill feared] if the Wagner bill passes in its present form, the
power and influence of the labor movement will be greatly
1511d.at 121.
152For development of the ideas behind the Wagner Act, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder
of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAsH L. REv. 285
(1987); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Drafting Wagner's Act: Leon Keyserling and the PrecommitteeDrafts
of the Labor DisputesAd and the NationalLabor Relations Act, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 73 (1989).
1531 HERBERT HILT, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 99 (1977) (quoting
T. Arnold Hill, Old Settings in New Scenes, OPPORTUNITY, Feb. 1934, at 58).
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enhanced with the consequent danger of greater restrictions
154
being practiced against Negro workers by organized labor.
Exclusions aside, among workers eligible for NLRA protection, the
future Labor Board and the federal courts would instead emphasize
the industrial peace made possible by government of the workplace
under the collective bargain. This emphasis would reduce the economic power of union organization necessary to foster redistribution. 155 Similarly, the Social Security Act was never completely under
Senator Wagner's control. Wagner and his aid, Leon Keyserling,
both preferred a federal program, not only for the sake of uniformity but also to establish minimum standards of purchasing power.
Wagner, however yielded to Roosevelt. Thus neither collective bargaining nor unemployment insurance resulted in complete expressions of this Keynesian animating vision.
Indeed, in explaining her opposition to the proposed NLRA,
Mary Van Kleeck predicted judicial and administrative retrenchment
of the Act's redistributive potential precisely because workers were
denied control over investment: 'Tundamentally I believe it is impossible to equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees,
since necessarily the decision to produce at all and in what quantities
and by what processes-such, for instance, as increase in mechanization-rests with the employer."15 6 Van Kleeck believed that the Act
forced unions to sacrifice power for a vision of industrial peace:
Strikes which have for their purpose gradual increase in the
workers' power in a period when fundamental economic
change in the ownership of industry can clearly be envisaged
may only seem to check the rising power of the exponents of
human rights, and indeed to protect private property rights
in exchange for obligations which are likely to be merely the
least common denominator of industrial practice....
[I] t seems to me to be self-evident that a strike for any
purpose listed in the bill as an "unfair labor practice," including a strike for the making of a trade-union agreement or
against the discharge of a union member or on other points
I'4_dL at 105 (quoting T. Arnold Hill, Labor Marches On, OPPORTUNITY, Apr. 1934, at
120-21).
1
of the WagnerAd and the Origins ofModern Legal
" See Karl E. KlareJudicialDeradicalization
Consciousness: 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
156 Letter from Mary Van Kleeck to Sen. Robert EWagner 1-2 (Mar. 12, 1934) (on file with
Leon Keyserling Papers, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.).
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involved in the forming and establishment of a strong union,
would necessarily have to be discouraged on the ground that
these are matters within the jurisdiction of a statutory federal
157
body, the National Labor Board.
The original structure of the Social Security Act more directly
limited its recovery potential. By using state benefits determinations
and reserves funds, much of the purchasing power rationale for recovery would be diminished. In fact, the results might be perverse: "Unemployment reserves are incapable of mobilization when needed and
any attempt to mobilize them will only result in further intensification
of depressions.' 1 8 Moreover, by limiting benefit periods, those persons
permanently unemployed by technology or depression would be required to retrain for new jobs; benefits would not sustain them if their
skills or labor were no longer necessary to management in full control
over investment in technology or changes in the division of labor. The
Administration programs were designed simply to ameliorate the normal contractual order, leaving workers "forced to maintain themselves
in idleness, awaiting the time when the industrial system will need them
for renewed production." 59
In a sense, such a reserves plan primarily supports business by
subsidizing labor pools of skills defined by eligibility standards outside
the control of workers. The existence of these skilled pools removes
the need for employers to guard themselves against labor supply fluctuation by contracting for fixed durations or by modifying their investment control over the firm's division of labor. The at-will contract, another American particularism, thus is made more viable independent
of its simultaneous protection by contract law. 60 Moreover, given employer leverage over at-will employees who can be fired for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all, organization becomes more difficult;
and once employees are organized, their ability to bargain over the
division of labor in the enterprise and its relation to the division of
union and non-union jobs is decidedly limited. The Social Security
approach to labor pool reserves, and to individualizing risk within
1571&,
158 H.R. REP. No. 418, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Mar. 15, 1935) (quoting Elgin Groseclose, The

Chimera of Unemployment Reserves Under the American Money System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1935).

159 Mary Van Kleeck, Speech Before National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance 2 (Jan. 5-7, 1935) (on file with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
160For a discussion of the relationship between contemporary unemployment insurance and
the at-will contract, see Casebeer, supra note 8,at 790-93.
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insurance pools, fits precisely in the collective bargaining policy of
private governance within industrial pluralism which eventuated in
Taft-Hartley.
The Wagner-Lewis unemployment reserves bill increased the state's
potential to undermine workers' economic power in other ways:
The insecurity of the working class is further emphasized by
the drive of big business against trade-union organization. If
employed workers strike to prevent further wage-cuts or to
advance present rates, their lack of reserves undermines their
power of endurance in a strike; and from the masses of
unemployed are drawn willing strike breakers, while all the
apparatus of the blacklist and discrimination against workers
161
for trade-union activities is put into operation.
For her part, Van Kleeck did not trust the NLRA's unfair labor
practice machinery to prevent such control over workers. Only a
more fundamental industrial change of approach to both control
of investment and social insurance could provide the worker security that she favored:
[T]he programs which have been described all center in
provisions for mere compensation for insecurity. Except as
they stimulate and coordinate organized action by workers in
all occupations, they do not touch the essential elements of
a program for security. Basically this calls for the development
of a planned economy founded upon the maximum utilization of America's productive capacity... assuming as a prerequisite the socialization of all industrial processes.162
Senator Wagner well understood the relation between labor organization and job security:
Workers believe in collective bargaining ....

They have an

additional right to speak because millions of their brethren
are still unemployed, still searching endlessly in a dismal
quest for jobs. They believe further that they are entitled to
be heard because their own jobs are constantly threatened by
technological changes, or the displacement of men by machines. They feel that they should not be ignored upon the
question of a living wage for their families. They are sold
161Mary Van Kleeck, United Action for Social Security, NEw MAssEs, Apr. 7, 1936, at 12.
162 Id. at 13.
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upon the proposition that the worker's rights to some voice
in the business from which he draws his bread is as fundamental as his right to some voice in the government from
which he gets his laws. They do not want supremacy, but they
do want equality. They do not want to dictate, but they are
determined to be free. 63
According to its draftsperson, Van Kleeck, it was the Workers' Bill
and not the NLRA which provided the most powerful institutional
form for the development of this very vision of workplace democracy:
It must be clearly recognized that the aims envisaged in the
political democracy of the United States have not been fulfilled
under the conditions of highly centralized economic development controlled by corporations which are representative
of ownership and not of workers. This long struggle, as yet
far from victory, to secure the right of collective bargaining
for the trade unions of the United States, shows how far we
are from democracy in economic life. The claim that workers
should control the administration of social insurance is a
reinforcement of this struggle for a voice for the workers in
economic policies and industrial management. 16
II.

STRUGGLE SANITIZED: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNDER SOCIAL

SECURITY
[T]he sense of desperation that unemployment can breed. Nobody
had to explain this to me, for example, after watching the march
of the unemployed across the ParkerDunn Memorial Bridge over
the Hudson and seeing the struggle between them and State troopers, some of whom then proceeded to throw a couple of them into
the riverfrom there. You didn'thave to explain to me how desperate
unemployed people could be. Nor did you have to explain to any
of the others in my generation. We knew it; and if we hadn't
experienced it ourselves, we had come close enough.
Ralph Altman, Chief, Analysis Unit, Unemployment Insurance
Division, Bureau of Employment Security 65
163 Robert Wagner, Speech to Labor Institute (Feb. 29, 1936) (on file with Wagner Papers,
supra note 11).

164 Mary Van Kleeck, Speech Before National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance 3 (Jan. 5-7, 1935) (on file with Lundeen Papers, supra note 77).
165 RALPH ALTMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BEGINNING THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PRO-
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Successful business men elect themselves by "naturalselection" in
the strugglefor profits, through ability to "hire andfire" subordinates and thus command the confidence of investors .... But,
modern capitalismfails in giving that security to jobs which it
gives to investments.
Edmund Witte, Executive Director, Committee on Economic
Security166
This section examines how the conventional historical view of
social security policy, which seemingly developed as an independently
coherent view, actually formed in response to the alternative social
wage model which Social Security displaced.
Edmund Witte and other architects of Social Security assumed
that public policy should provide safeguards against the externalities
of market forces and relations. They also assumed that the inherent
insecurity ofjobs and of investments were appropriately separate topics
of policy, although they recognized that the insecurity of the former
was directly linked to the latter because jobs were necessarily subordinated to investments. Private organization yielded greater social good;
the public was coextensive with the private. This was an underlying
assumption which did not change even as the New Deal created new
labor law. In fact, it was recognized that employees must be kept from
interfering with privatized social efficiency. Witte asks:
Why do wage-earners take to the idea that "labor," as a class,
can manage industry better than business men? . . . Early
economists and socialists, astonished by the industrial revolution, beginning at the close of the eighteenth century, emphasized capital and labor as productive, meaning by 'capital'
stored-up labor and by 'labor' the producing power of workers. But these do not produce wealth. Wealth is produced by
the credit system. . . . The credit system is simply that
confidence in the future that springs from fulfillment of contracts and private property.167
The idea that a social producer was entitled to a governmentally
assured living standard was simply inconsistent with the private
GRAM-AN ORAL HISTORY 8 (Helen Manheimer & Evangeline Cooper eds., 1985) (Unemployment Insurance: Occasional Paper 85-5) [hereinafter BEGINNING THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM].
1
6Edmund E. Witte, Unemployment-Prevention and Insurance 2 (undated) (on file with
Witte Papers, supra note 132).
167Id at 1.
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system of investments. This was true even if the entitlement did not
extend to property in the job. Accordingly, investment decisions
could not answer to worker management, even to the extent that
the workers' management of unemployment funds or eligibility
would have an impact upon either management discipline of workers or available capital.
Eventually the very stability of society would require some response to increasing job insecurity, a condition which was exacerbated
because workers were at the mercy of employers' individual and aggregate investment decisions. Witte noted: "If the labor problem is a
serious problem ahead, it is because it gets its bitterness from the
inability of business to safeguard the security of employment."1 68 Government, functioning as the agent of social capital, had no choice but
to adopt a program to ameliorate the consequences of job insecurity.
As Witte observed:
But we do hear that capital gets its profits out of the reserve
army of the unemployed-and there is no effective reply. For
the sake of capitalism and even of a civilization which, like
capitalism, depends on confidence, capitalists should look
ahead and assume legal responsibility for security of jobs
parallel to their legal responsibility for security of investments. 169
To a limited extent, security of income was provided under Social
Security. Those limits on Social Security were defined to cause minimum disruption of existing capital organization. Unemployment compensation, as described by a Social Security Board publication in 1937:
is a method of safe-guarding individuals against distress for a
short period of time after they become unemployed. It is
designed to compensate only employable persons who are
able and willing to work and who are unemployed through
no fault of their own ....

[u]nemployment compensation

sets aside contributions during periods of employment and
provides the individual with benefits as a legal right when he
becomes unemployed.

170

Unemployment compensation was to be a limited benefit; it applied
only to certain people, under prescribed circumstances, for a lim168Id. at 14-15.
69
1 Id. at 15.
170

SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, PUB. No. 14, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION WHAT AND WHY?

7 (1937).
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ited period of time. Its beneficiaries were deserving because they
had a history of employment, were willing to work, and were not to
blame for their current joblessness. Unemployment insurance was
to be distinguished from public relief or the dole; the benefits were
earned entitlements because the money paid out during times of
idleness had been specifically set aside for that purpose during
times of employment. Finally, the right to the benefit, because it was
earned, vested at a time a worker became unemployed. The government applied no means test and the worker made no showing of
need.
Title IX of the Social Security Act had its genesis in early 1934
when Senator Wagner and Congressman Lewis offered a bill designed
to encourage states to pass unemployment compensation laws. The bill
was not reported out of committee. Soon after, however, the Committee on Economic Security, which was created by Roosevelt to make
recommendations for a comprehensive economic security plan, reported unanimous agreement that federal legislation enabling states
to pass unemployment compensation laws was desirable and necessary.
President Roosevelt presented the Committee's recommendations
to Congress on January 17, 1935, urging prompt action. On the same
day, bills incorporating the recommendations of the Committee and
the President on unemployment compensation were introduced to
Congress by Wagner, Lewis and Doughton. Hearings began almost
immediately, and much of the extensive testimony was devoted to the
unemployment compensation provisions. In both the House and the
Senate, the bills passed by overwhelming majorities in both parties.
The conference committee's report was adopted in both houses without even a roll call vote.
The final version of the Social Security Act does not set up a
federal system, nor does it provide for federal regulation of unemployment insurance. Rather, Titles III and IX create incentives for states to
establish their own unemployment compensation plans, but leave the
questions of who contributes to the fund, the amount and duration of
the benefits, and requirements for eligibility completely in the hands
of the states. The bill levies a payroll tax of three percent on employers
of eight or more (with certain exceptions, notably agricultural and
domestic labor), against which a credit of up to ninety percent may be
taken for amounts contributed to state unemployment compensation
plans which meet federal approval.
Federal approval will be granted if the state plan meets certain
requirements, but these requirements, rather than setting minimum
standards for benefits, are "intended merely to define a genuine un-
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employment compensation law as distinguished from relief and to
safeguard the solvency of the fund and prohibit use of the funds to
lower labor standards." 7 1 Benefits must be paid through public employment offices. Contributions to the state fund must be transferred
to a federal unemployment trust fund, and money withdrawn from the
fund must be used only to pay benefits. These requirements ensure
that the funds deposited for the purpose of paying unemployment
benefits will not be dissipated for other purposes; they also serve to
distance the fund, conceptually and practically, from public relief.
The Report from the Committee on Economic Security, President
Roosevelt's speeches urging adoption of the legislation, testimony from
the hearings and contemporary commentary all reveal the fundamental precept behind unemployment compensation: that the citizens of
a country who have contributed to its progress and growth have a right
to expect protection against the effects of bad times:
Unemployment insurance or reserves are... imperative as a
matter of social justice. Economic society is as much the
creation of the worker as of anyone else. He is entitled to
share in its benefits, and he should not be made to bear more
172
than his just portion of its burdens.
The advent of the Depression obviously had a profound effect
on public attitudes toward unemployment insurance.... [A]s

more and more people came face to face with unemployment
they became increasingly preoccupied with the need for an
income dependent on their willingness to work, not on the
success or failure of the economy to provide steady employ173

ment.

Increasingly, unemployment was seen as "something practically outside the control of the individual wage earner.'1 74 Yet this awareness
was not acted upon solely in the spirit of public generosity. Wilbur
Cohen makes clear that the proponents of reform were acutely
aware of the social struggle which arose to respond to the crises:
You have to go back and realize that with the Great Depression of 1929-33, and with 25 percent of the labor market
71

Id. at 33.

17278 Cong. Rec. S1898, S1901 (Feb. 5, 1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
17
3NELSON, supranote 127, at 129.
174 Unemployment Insurance: Hearingson H.R 7659 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 253-54 (1934) (statement of Hon. William Green,
President, AFL).
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unemployed, there were people who were concerned that
America was on the verge of some kind of an internal revolution. And there were all kinds of nostrums - the Townsend
Plan, and Huey Long's "every man a king", and so on. And
so the people who came to work for social security and unemployment insurance had, underneath this all, a conception
that they were grappling with a great rejuvenation of the
social order, and that they were, in a sense, helping to maintain a fabric against social disintegration, socio-political disintegration. And this had a great unifying and emotional im175
pact in a cohesive manner.
Although the Depression heightened the awareness ofjob insecurity, advocates of unemployment insurance stressed that unemployment was not a result of the Depression, and unemployment would
not simply disappear upon the return of normal economic conditions:
"[E]ven in prosperous years there is a large reservoir of unemployed
....[T]heir number rarely falls below 1,000,000 and it often exceeds
2,000,000.176 Moreover:

Economic and technical forces may change industry over
night and wipe out the demand for skills that workers have
acquired by decades of work ....[F] or unemployment that
occurs in normal years we have a definite obligation to provide reserves to meet the needs of those for whom work is
not available.

177

This realization that unemployment was a permanent part of the
economic future of the country put the needs of temporarily unemployed workers-and by extension the solution to their problem-in a different category from those whose needs were traditionally met through charity or public relief: "[I]n this depression we
have come to recognize that people who are in need of public
assistance because of unemployment should be treated differently
178
from chronic paupers."
This response to the social protest over job insecurity caused a
political split between concerned workers and those who were already
17OInterview with Wilber Cohen, BEGINNING THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM,

supranote 165, at 7.
176
Heaings on H.R. 7659, supra note 174, at 255 (statement of William Green, President,
AFL).
177
Id, at 254 (statement of William Green, President, AFL).
178Edwin E. Witte, The Government and Unemployment, 25 AM. LAB. LEGIs. Rm. 5,5 (1935).
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impoverished. Indeed, unemployment insurance was not designed to
help those who were most in need at the time of the legislation-the
unemployed: "Unemployment compensation insurance is a dignified,
morale-preserving method of supporting the unemployed, far superior
to relief, but not a solution of the unemployment problem." 179 It was
designed to supplement, not supplant public works. Unemployment
insurance was repeatedly distinguished from relief and charity: "Unemployment compensation is not a substitute for the provision of
relief."180
This careful distinction between relief, charity and unemployment
compensation was evident in the characterization that recipients deserved benefits because they were blameless for their plight. The distinction was also evident in the limits placed on the benefit; it would
be available only for a limited time period, and only to a certain class
of workers who had previously been employed and were willing to
work. The administrative structure of the legislation (proponents of
the bill pointed out that "[u] nemployment compensation if it is not to
be mere relief, must be based on the contributions that are received" )18'
also illustrates the distinction to be made between unemployment
compensation and charity.
Much attention was paid to the dignity of the recipient of the
compensation:
Relief is a degrading thing for an individual. He has no right
to it. He gets it after an investigation as to whether he is in
need. You cannot ignore the moral factor in a workingman
who knows that if he is thrown out of work for no fault of his
1 82
own he is guaranteed a benefit.
Unemployment compensation was more dignified, more humane,
more certain, and more economical than emergency relief: "[C]harity
is a poor substitute for earned income. So long as we live under a
system in which industrious men normally win their bread by working, industrious men suffer degradation when they must exist by
83
begging.'1
1791d.at 11.
180

SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, supra note 170, at 8.

18 1

Eveline Burns, Common Sense and Unemployment Compensation, 45 AM. FEDERATIONIST

252 (1938) (quoting testimony from Senate Hearing on the Economic Security Act).
82

1 Heafings onH.R. 7659,supranote 174, at 31 (statement of Hon. Harry Hopkins, Federal
Emergency
Relief Administration).
8
1 31d. at 29 (statement of Hon. Robert F. Wagner, United States Senator from N.Y.).
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Unemployment compensation, then, differed from relief not only
because the worker was not to blame for his own unemployment, but
because the benefit was also a right which had been earned through
work, paid through direct or indirect contributions to the fund and to
the economic health of the nation: "It is generally agreed that unemployment compensation should be viewed as an earned right.' a84 Indeed:
Labor is an essential element in production. Production cannot be carried on without workers. These workers put their
time, their abilities, their responsibility, their very lives, into
the day's work. That investment gives them a claim on the
industry to which they are attached which constitutes an
investment in their job.185
Payments have been made as a matter of right, and both the benefits
and the cost are related to the payroll.
An unemployed worker did not have to demonstrate need to
receive the benefit. "[T] he characteristic that separates unemployment
compensation is the more favorable conditions under which the contractual benefits are given. No means test is applied, and, as a general
rule, there is no pressure to take work at less, or substantially less, than
prevailing wages for the duration of compensation rights."'' 8 Unemployment compensation is preferable to relief because it is a "contrac1 87
tual right not dependent on any means test."
This earned right, however, was a limited or partial entitlement,
limited by the amount of the benefit, the length of payments, and
worker eligibility:
Unemployment insurance cannot give complete and unlimited compensation to all who are unemployed. Any attempt
to make it do so confuses unemployment insurance with
relief, which it is designed to replace in large part. It can give
compensation only for a limited period and for a percentage
188
of the wage loss.
184Smith Simpson, Should Unemployment CompensationBe Based on Earnings orNeed, 28 Am.
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 136, 137 (1938).
185Hearings on H.R 7659, supra note 174, at 255 (statement of William Green, President,
AFL).
186
Eveline M. Burns, The Relation of Unemployment Compensation to the Broader Problem of
Relief 3 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 150, 153 (1936).

187H.R REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935).
188 Ia at 7.
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If only some unemployed would receive benefits, the market for
labor would define criteria for selection: "The system protects only
job seekers who are already and genuinely attached to the labor
force and belong to covered occupations. " 189 Furthermore, within
this subclass the limit on amounts and duration should also be set
by market or labor pool needs. "Unemployment compensation should
permit such a worker, who becomes unemployed to draw a cash
benefit for a limited period during which there is expectation that
he will soon be reemployed.' 90
The distinction between unemployment as an earned right and
relief is also reflected in the structure of the Act, which vests administration of unemployment compensation in the states, but provides
that the federal government will participate by encouraging states to
enact laws, and by holding and investing all unemployment reserve
funds. President Roosevelt, addressing the National Conference on
Economic Security, urged this cooperative federal-state structure and
"expressed his concern that unemployment insurance must not be
allowed to become a dole through the mingling of insurance and
relief: 'It is not charity. It must be financed by contributions, not
taxes.'191
Daniel Nelson sees the basic theme in the development of unemployment insurance as a "long-term effort by reformers... to reach a
middle ground between the need for something besides relief and the
popular willingness to allow businessmen to cope with complex industrial problems.' 92 The link between workers' needs and the need for
economic stabilization is apparent in the dual-purpose promotion of
the legislation by Roosevelt, Wagner and others. The bill was designed
to correct "the social injustice of providing the least protection for the
workers who need it most, and of shifting to their backs the heaviest
and most immediate burdens of depression.' 93 But another "important
feature of this bill is its emphasis upon the stabilization incentive. An
employer who has succeeded in reducing his State contribution because of success in regularizing employment will receive an additional
rebate as a reward for his efforts."194 Additionally, the bill was advocated
as a means of "initiating a flow of purchasing power into the hands of
189 Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemployment Insurancewithin the Patternsand Policies
ofProtedion against Wage-Loss, 8 VAND. L. REV. 218, 232 (1955).
190 H.R.REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., lst Sess. 14 (1935).
191 EDWIN E. WITE, DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 118-19 (1963).
192 NELSON, supra note 127, at 219.

193 Hearingson H.R. 7659, supra note 174, at 29-30 (statement of Hon. Robert Wagner).
Id at 30 (statement of Hon. Robert Wagner).

194

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:259

consumers" which would help to "check an impending depression by
releasing new stimulants to consumer demand." These, in turn, would
benefit "every group by promoting industrial stability."" 5
III. STRUGGLE FORGOTTEN: THE EMPLOYMENT IMAGE IN THE
ADJUDICATED LAW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Congress viewed unemployment insurancepayments as a means
of exerting an influence upon the stabilizationof industry. "Their
only distinguishingfeature is that they will be specially earmarked
for the use of the unemployed at the very times when it is best for
business that they should be so used. "Early payment of insurance
benefits serves to prevent a decline in the purchasingpower of the
unemployed, which in turn serves to aid industries producing
goods and services.
Chief Justice Warren Burger

96

This section demonstrates how the judicial task of interpreting
legislative classification, when divorced from the contested origination
of social policy, takes on a life of its own which is driven by the very
need to classify. This judicial practice reflects a fixed vision of reality
that is not necessarily grounded in any history of legislative politics. It
is an opening to politics independently chosen by the judiciary.
The model of the employment relationship based on the mobility
of both employers' and employees' capital, given its accompanying
consumption-oriented division of labor, should rarely tolerate a public
interest in job market stability. This should be particularly true where
the public, by imposing a risk-pooling insurance term in most employment contracts, attempts to share some degree of labor force availability despite the disruptions in employees' lives created by employers'
capital mobility:
There are, indeed, other causes of unemployment besides the
credit cycle, but these are not as serious, and are even useful.
The "labor turnover", up to an uncertain point, is useful. It
is liberty to quit the employer and look for a better job, or
197
liberty to dismiss the worker and look for a better one.
195
1

Id (statement of Hon. Robert Wagner).

9California Dep't of Human Resource Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971) (quoting
Statement ofFederalReliefAdministratorandMemberofthe Committee onEconomic Security, Hearings
on H.R. 4120 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1935)
(statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner)).
197Witte, supra note 166, at 4.
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As a matter of both policy and doctrine, only some workers' purchasing power needs to be publicly insured through enforced employer-employee risk pooling:
To sum up, unemployment compensation offers a number of
advantages to employers, employees, and the government.
From the employer's point of view, the existence of such a
plan is a means of maintaining a reserve of workers, who
198
cannot be continuously employed, in the various industries.
A worker's insurability against unemployment turns on key assumptions that define the distinction between involuntary and voluntary detachment from the labor force. The underlying requirement for
unemployment compensation eligibility is that the claimant be available to work. 199 The threshold question for initial eligibility is: did the
claimant involuntarily leave his or her past employment? If a worker
was discharged for cause, she is held to have forfeited or waived her
connection to that specific job and therefore to have voluntarily left
her employment. Similarly, a voluntary quit without good cause, which
in almost all jurisdictions also must be attributable to the employer, is
a voluntary ending of employment. Good cause, in this context, is
more than a good personal reason for refusing to work. The reason
must indicate that the workers' unemployment is involuntary. Voluntary termination without good cause establishes ineligibility for compensation at the outset.200 Involuntary detachment occurs through the
employer's unilateral action ("discharge without cause") or when the
employee quits or refuses employment for publicly approved reasons.
Voluntary detachment stems from the employee's action ("discharge
for cause") or her purely personal reasons for terminating employment.
The criteria for continued eligibility exhibit the same underlying
concern. All compensated individuals must demonstrate that they are
currently and will continue to be part of the labor force. They must be
ready and willing to accept suitable work. The requirement that claimants be available for work demands that they do more than simply
register with an employment agency. They must actively seek work and
demonstrate a mental attitude which indicates actual availability. Addi198

SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, supra note 170, at 11.
199For the leading work on early development of these statutory criteria, see RALPH A.
ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK: A STUDY IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 74-85 (1950).

200 See, e.g., Tannariello v. Federation of Pub. Employees, 437 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (reasonable fear for personal safety may be good cause); Gibson v. Rutledge, 298
S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1982) (cessation of work for health reasons held involuntary).
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tionally, claimants may not refuse suitable work offers without good
cause. A question arises whether good cause to refuse suitable work in
a continuing eligibility situation is the same as good cause to quit in
establishing initial eligibility. Variables weighed by the courts in determining whether good cause exists for refusing suitable work include
transportation difficulties, 2 1 health risks, 20 2 past training and experience, 20 3 comparability of earnings in the available job, 20 4 prospects for
securing other work, 20 5 and the duration of the worker's unemploy206
ment.
In judicial construction, these variables which define involuntary
unemployment have been neither stable nor determinant. Jurisdictions differ between each other and internally over time. The most
thorough study of cases at the midpoint of the program's operation
observed:
Unfortunately the broad statutory formulae-such as "unemployed," "able and available," "refusal of suitable work," "Voluntary leaving without good cause"--do not entirely obviate
the necessity of going back to first principles and major objectives and have not infrequently induced the courts either
to read their own standards of compensability into the acts
or to rest their decisions on incidental technicalities of statutory language. Moreover, the various tests sometimes seem to
situations
overlap or conflict in their application to specific
20 7
and thereby create the danger of arbitrariness.
Although individual cases may be decided differently, in the aggregate, certain assumptions consistently structure the manner in which
the doctrinal variables are deployed.
B. Skilled Labor Reserves
The public will not insure workers against the consequences of
unemployment unless those consequences affect the public interest.
The primary public interest served is the preservation and availability
201

Brenner v. Commissioner, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 461 A.2d 921, 922
(Pa. 202
Commw. Ct. 1983).
Alexander v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 163 Cal. Rptr. 411,412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
2 03
Perfin v. Cole, 327 S.E.2d 396, 402 (W. Va. 1985).
2
04In reUnemployment Appeal of Fickbohm, 323 N.W.2d 133, 136 (S.D. 1982).
205 In reBehnke, 469 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
206
Ellwood City Hosp. v. Commonwealth Unempl. Compensation Bd. of Rev., 457 A.2d 231,
233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
2
07Riesenfeld, supra note 189, at 236 (footnotes omitted).
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of skills in the marketplace. If the employer is not required to acknowledge either the employee's personal reasons for leaving work or the
employee's interest in the job (because no property right inheres in a
job, especially under at-will employment) there is no public interest in
providing benefits to an employee who voluntarily leaves her employment.2 08 The leading case of Dubkowski v. Administrato, Unemployment
CompensationAct makes this explicit:
The development and preservation of worker skills and the
advancement and utilization of employee training are of general public concern. The unemployment compensation law is
designed to protect rather than depress the present social
status and standard of living of a claimant ....
"Employment which may not be suitable while there is still
a good present expectancy of obtaining other employment
more nearly proportionate to the ability of the worker may
become suitable if that expectancy is not realized within a
reasonable time. Employment which may be unsuitable in a
period of full employment may be suitable in a period of
depression or of falling wages ....

To force a worker to accept a job at less than his highest
20

8In California and Massachusetts, involuntary unemployment occurs for any good reason
over which the employee has no control-whether caused by the employer, or ajob offer or the
employee's personal circumstances (e.g. transportation inadequacies)-or any good reason for
which the individual should not be expected to be subjected to the market place (e.g. domestic
obligations). See, e.g., Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1977);
Raytheon Co. v. Director Div. of Empl. Sec., 307 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Mass. 1974). Such reasons do
not, however, allow a sharp public/private dichotomy. Just as in these same jurisdictions a sharp
public/private dichotomy was not available to define the public policy exception to at-will
discharges, it is not available to determine what constitutes involuntary detachment. A comparison between cases dealing with at-will discharge and those dealing with involuntary detachment
is illustrative. CompareTamenyv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330,1335 (Cal. 1980) (wrongful
discharge suit sounds in tort because of employer's ex delicto duty to refrain from coercing
employee's participation in criminal activity that contravenes public policy; issue whether such
suit sounds in contract left open) and Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
728-29 (Cal. Ct App. 1980) (employer's discharge of employee without legal cause may violate
implied covenant of good faith, thus wrongful discharge suit may sound in contract as well as
tort because of public interest in job security serving an interest in social stability) and Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (employer breached
contract because it failed to exercise good faith when it discharged employee to avoid paying full
commission, in spite of apparent authority to withhold payment under contract, but court
declined to decide whether tort remedy was available for wrongful discharge) with Sanchez, 569
P.2d at 749-50 (because state statutes impose on parents responsibility to their children, unemployment insurance system must balance parental duties against burdens of work in determining
"good cause" qualification to availability for work) and Raytheon, 307 N.E.2d at 333 (employee
left involuntarily because she had no means of transportation to herjob, thus was not disqualified
from receiving unemployment compensation). Most jurisdictions, however, treat such personal
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skill at the peril of losing his unemployment compensation
might result in the loss of this skill and is economic waste
which should be avoided as long as there is a reasonable
probability of its not being necessary.... It seems reasonable,
therefore, that work at a lesser skill and lower wages should
not be deemed suitable unless a claimant has been given a
reasonable period in which to compete in the labor market
for available jobs at his higher skill or related skills .... ,,209
Even direct public intervention in the contractual organization of
the labor market fosters rather than corrupts the private nature of the
employment relationship. Unemployment insurance is a publicly imposed risk-pooling term of the wage contract that reinforces at-will
employment contracting and thus fosters employers' and employees'
capital mobility. Employers need not tie themselves to durational contracts to ensure the preservation and availability of a skilled workforce,
and employees are assured to some extent of job searches that will
result in the use of their skills. However, insurable mobility cannot
include employees' personal restrictions on job continuance or acceptability without impinging upon management's prerogative to control
2 10
investment by defining and offering positions in the labor market.
In theory, a reserve labor pool tailored to include only readily available
workers enhances the power of labor, workers' capital, to move to its
highest market-valued use at the same time that consumption demand
is stabilized. 211 This depends upon whether aggregate private investreasons for refusing to work as voluntary reasons or incapacities and therefore do not recognize
"good cause" for refusing suitable employment. See, e.g., Aladdin Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d
161, 163 (Tenn. 1966).
209188 A.2d at 658 (Conn. 1963) (quoting, respectively, Pacific Mills v. Director of Div. of
Empl. Sec., 77 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Mass. 1948); Louise F. Freeman, Able to Work and Available for
Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123, 127 (1945); Arthur M. Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work 55 YALE LJ. 134,
142 (1945)).
210
The distinction between personal, and thus voluntary, absence from the labor market and
publicly sanctioned, insurable reasons for absence makes refusal of suitable work because of child
care responsibilities voluntary absence. Only in California are domestic obligations recognized
as good cause for refusal of suitable work. See Sanchez, 569 P.2d at 750. More typical is Tennessee,
where a woman who refused a transfer to a night shift for child care reasons was held to have
voluntarily refused suitable work. Scott, 407 S.W.2d at 164.
To uphold the decision of the Board of Review would be placing in the hands of
the employee the right to determine when and under what conditions she would
work. Such a holding would unduly restrict the employer and could conceivably
under certain circumstances, make it almost impossible to carry on a business
during certain hours.
211 Chief Justice Burger, in CaliforniaDep't of Human Resources De,. v. Java, described the
program:

March 1994]

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

ment decisions, as well as the division of labor within enterprises,
continue to determine a demand for those skills which need to be
preserved and which elicit comparatively higher market values. The
reserve pool is therefore a public resource which is either inadequately
provided or provided at high cost by the market. Not surprisingly, the
craft-oriented AFL leadership recognized this limit when it argued for
the unemployment reserves approach. William Green testified, "I am
by industry will
confident that a full return for the investment made
212
come through the maintenance of a trained force.
Unemployment compensation rationalizes the labor market as a
public skill pool. First, workers who do casual labor or fungible labor,
often domestic and agricultural workers, are excluded entirely. Second,
only workers who have demonstrated attachment to the labor market
by working in a single job for a qualifying period, usually thirteen
weeks, become eligible. Finally, covered workers, by definition steady
job-holders, must be currently attached to the labor market and "available for work."
Unemployment insurance primarily benefits the employer by reducing some of the costs of employing workers from the primary labor
market. That is, unemployment insurance provides a reserve labor
pool which enables an employer to lay off and later recall the insured
worker without having to train a new employee:
But I know that employers that really wanted to avoid layoffs
sometimes kept people on after it was economically sound to
do it, and unemployment insurance met that need. And it
also made it possible for employers to retain their work force.
In a great many situations, they were laid off for a short
period of time. They are carried on [Unemployment InsurIt is true, as appellants argue, that the unemployment compensation insurance
program was not based on need in the sense underlying the various welfare programs that had their genesis in the same period of economic stress a generation
ago. A kind of 'need' is present in the statutory scheme for insurance, however, to

the extent that any 'salary replacement' insurance fulfills a need caused by lost
employment ....
Further, providing for 'security during the period following unemployment' was
thought to be a means of assisting a worker to find substantially equivalent employment. The Federal Relief Administrator testified that the Act 'covers a great many
thousands of people who are thrown out of work suddenly. It is essential that they
be permitted to look for ajob. They should not be doing anything else but looking
for ajob.'
402 U.S. 121, 130, 132 (1971) (footnote omitted).
212 Hearings on H.R. 7659, supra note 174, at 257 (statement of William Green, President,

AFL).
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ance], and they continue with that employer. A lot of employ21 3
ers think that's very important.

This labor reserve is in fact subsidized by the existing employees of
the firm. The AFL knew this in 1936:
In the end, however, this tax could be shifted, in whole or in
part, to the employees by reducing their wages or by not
raising their wages when this was necessary. The same result
would be accomplished if prices were raised, if fewer workers
were used, if hours were lengthened, and if the speed-up and
21 4
stretch-out systems were inaugurated by the employer.
To some extent the preservation of a reserve labor pool also benefits
the covered employee by providing insurance against the need to
retrain or relocate. However, workers in the employer's secondary
labor market are also affected to the extent that many such employees do not meet the "base period worked" standard for eligibility,
and there are frequent voluntary quits due to the nature of the
employment:
Since the unemployment insurance program is commonly
perceived as providing aid to families that have fallen upon
hard times, it may be surprising that families with incomes
over $20,000 in 1970 received 10% of the program's benefits
.... Program rules require, for example, that recipients have
a firm attachment to the labor force, work in a covered
industry, and, with a few exceptions, become unemployed
through an employer initiated termination .... Specifically,
relative to lower-income groups, the upper-income groups
have a greater propensity to participate in the labor force...,
a greater percent of labor force participants working in covered industries . .. , and larger weekly benefits per recipient.2 15
The basic principle of labor market rationalization is skill subsidy.
The Supreme Court of Vermont decided that a worker's refusal of
213 Interview with Robert Goodwin, BEGINNING THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM,
supra
note 165, at 6.
2 14

Walter L. Daykin, The Incidence of Unemployment Compensation, 45 Am. FEDERATIONIST
818, 819 (1938).
215 Robert Hutchins, DistributionalEquity in the Unemployment InsuranceSystem, 34 INDUST.
& LAB. REL. REV. 377, 383-85 (1980).
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suitable work was justified where she was laid off from a stenciling job
and refused to return to a prior position as a maid at a lower hourly
wage: 216 'Maximum utilization of a worker's skills and experience is a
recognized goal of the unemployment compensation system .... "217
Therefore:
[I] t is not the purpose of the unemployment compensation
law to force workers into jobs at the lowest levels of skill and
compensation. To do so under these circumstances would
contravene the general purposes of the law in the development and preservation of worker skills, and violate its express
comprovision that a claimant is barred from unemployment
21
pensation only if he refuses "suitable" work.
Yet the employee cannot choose his or her job skill. The more
training a previous job required, the less the latest employment
history seems to matter. If the majority of a claimant's work experience has been of a casual nature, the claimant will not be able to
wait for a position similar to his or her best prior job or requiring
the highest skill level if another past job requiring lesser skills
2 19
becomes available.
In a different vein, while "mere dissatisfaction with wages" generally does not constitute good cause attributable to the employer, because the employer must be free to structure his labor costs in a
manner which will keep the business viable, a "substantial" reduction
in pay constitutes good cause to leave employment.220 At some point
an employee who has become non-viable at a previous market wage
serves job market stability by qualifying for unemployment insurance
for the period of the search for similar employment. Such mobility of
labor, however, should not be insured based on the judgment of the
merely dissatisfied employee, but rather depends upon a unilateral
decision of the employer to reduce wages.
In Mohler v. Department of Labor, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that although the claimants had not expressed any restrictions on
their employability or detached themselves voluntarily from the labor
market by moving to another locality, but were detached only because
216

1n re Potvin, 313 A.2d 25, 28 (Vt. 1973).
217Id at 27.
218
Id. at 28.
219
See Martinez v. Employment Div., 634 P.2d 268, 270-71 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
22 0
Boucher v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 464 A.2d 171, 176 (Me. 1983).
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there were no labor opportunities where they resided, nevertheless,
because their normal past employment in canning work was seasonal
221
they failed to demonstrate attachment to a current labor market:
The habit, born over a long period of years, of working only
seasonally is indicative of a mental attitude of contentment to
remain out of the labor market during the off season of the
canning industry. Under such circunstances, it cannot be
said that either appellee was currently attached to the labor
market, and available for work within the requirement of our
222
Unemployment Compensation Act.
On the other hand, in Denver Symphony Association v. Industrial
Commission, seasonally employed musicians were eligible claimants because taking other jobs which were available in the Denver area would
not only require them to use different skills than they were trained for;
it would lower their pay rates as well.223 In Coman v. Administrator
Unemployment CompensationAct, the President of a septic tank company
had invested $30,000 in the business and owned substantially all of its
stock.224 In reaching its decision, the Connecticut Superior Court reasoned that:
[A]n employee is entitled to unemployment benefits in the
event of temporary layoffs or shutdowns by an employer due
to weather conditions which render it impossible or impractical to continue operations, as in the instant situation ....
This policy has been followed in claims by students, school
bus drivers whose employment is terminated at the end of the
school year and who are rehired in the fall, and construction
workers who are unable to work in winter because cold weather
225
forces the cessation of outside construction.
It would seem that the canning workers' interest in receiving benefits
during the off-season is as great as the interests of the musicians
and construction workers. The fundamental distinction between
the cases, however, is that the musicians' employer needs a skilled
labor pool while the canning workers' employer can hire virtually
22197 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ill. 1951).

2 1d. at 765. Accord Kelley v. Department of Labor, 513 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Il1.App. CL 1987)
(claimant seasonally employed as school crossing guard for 15 years found not available for work
and 22
thus not eligible for benefits).
3 See 526 P.2d 685, 688 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
224318 A.2d 649, 650 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973).
225 Id. In most states, students are excluded.
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anyone at the time of the canning harvest, particularly those who
are captive to a rural community. Consider the early experience
with seasonal industries in Florida:
We had, as you would expect in Florida, a resort-oriented kind
of an economy with a winter season in the southern part of
the State, and a complete closedown of the resort hotels, and
a citrus industry with closedown of canning plants and packing plants during the summer season. So early on, we began
trying to decide what to do about establishing seasonality
determinations and limiting benefits during periods of time
that were characteristically periods of unemployment. Quite
soon we found that in the cigar industry they didn't want any
limitation and seasonality provisions. They wanted to keep
intact a labor force and they were not interested, as far as the
industry was concerned, in any limitation during those periods.
However, the citrus industry took a different view to start
off with. Now packing was not originally covered because it
was considered to be non-covered employment because it was
assembling of farm produce. We subsequently did take action
in Florida to cover packing house workers earlier than Federal amendments covered them. Canning, however, was covered from the beginning, and their original belief was - the
industry standpoint - that benefits should not be paid during a very predictable period of time when the plants were
generally closed. But they did rely on local labor and subsequently changed their view that they should in fact pay
benefits in order to stabilize the work force and have the
226
workers there when they need them.
C. Discipline and Control
Beyond needing job histories which qualify them for benefits,
employees are also restrained in their conduct by the eligibility requirements which make the for cause discharge grounds for disqualification.
Ironically, the AFL old guard's fears about unemployment insurance
result from the specific form of insurance they ultimately helped pass:
"In fear ofjeopardizing their rights to Unemployment Compensation,
226 Interview with William Norwood, BEGINNING THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM,
supra note 165, at 55. Norwood was Director of the Florida State Unemployment Insurance
Service and later Director of the U.S. Employment Service. Id. at 65.
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workers will tend to accept conditions which otherwise they would
resist. The placing of undue emphasis on industrial peace by State
Governments will check seriously the workers in their struggle for
227
greater justice."
The combination of complete employer control over the bulk of
the labor force under at-will contracts, and control over job-creating
investment decisions insulated from mandatory bargaining under union contract, 228 reinforced the employers' ability to minimize the necessity for even the unemployment pool. When scientific management
and the processes of the division of labor are themselves management
tools, the craftsman has no more power to control his working conditions than the production worker or even the laborer. When labor is
fungible, it is cheap and it need not be subsidized to remain available
as a labor reserve.
The history of eligibility doctrine since 1937 has been one of
steadily tightening standards. Relatively early in the program's history,
the initial eligibility disqualification of voluntary quit without good
cause was changed by legislatures to voluntary quit without good cause
"attributable to the employer."2 9 "Only two states had that limitation
in 1938, two more had adopted it by 1940, and now [1944] it is in the
laws of eighteen states and in the regulations of one more. 23 0 This
change made clear the connection between good cause and the "public" interest in maximized investments. It must be the employer's choice
that makes an otherwise eligible worker part of the subsidized reserve.
D. Deskilling
Over the history of the program, the labor force has been progressively deskilled. This has resulted in a diminished need for employers to maintain a reserve of skilled workers:
The new technology has also permitted a substantial amount
of "deskilling." In the years following World War II, inside the
factory and later the office, managers were introducing new
machinery and radically reorganizing work tasks in ways that
reduced their dependence on high-priced skilled labor....
2

2Harold B. November, Workers'Discipline Under Unemployment Compensation,43 Abi. FEDERATIONIST 139, 142 (1936).
228 Cf Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964) (distinguished
capital investment decisions from decisions to contract out labor in holding that contracting out
decisions were subject to collective bargaining).
229 I at 221.
230Arthur J. Altmeyer, Undermining Unemployment Insurance,33 SuRvEy GRAPHIc 13, 13
(1944).
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The creation of these new technologies, and the work reorganizations to implement them, made it easier for managers
to take advantage of new sources of cheap and-at least,
initially--tractable labor in peripheral locations, both within
231
the country and beyond its borders.
After the initial qualification for benefits, the primary reason for
disqualification is a workers' refusal to take a suitable job without
good cause. Initially, a suitable job was considered to be the type of
job last held, or at least a job which utilized the same craft. Over
time, the definition of "suitable" expanded to encompass similar or
more generic skills, and finally virtually any job with lesser or inclusive skills. The employee was especially obligated to return to a
former employer who offered a different and less skilledjob.232 This
development was an early concern of the CIO whose workers were
vulnerable to pressures on wage gains:
Too often the job offered is actually quite unsuitable. Policies
on this matter vary greatly, depending on how vigorously
unions have defended workers' rights and succeeded in securing the right kind of unemployment insurance. This situation needs to be watched carefully, since bad policies by
employment security agencies; which administer the employment service and unemployment insurance, may force workers to accept substandard jobs, thus breaking down hard-won
233
wage levels.
Some confirmation of a shift in the labor market's need for a
reserve of skilled labor appears in the historical change in the court's
adjudication of the suitability of preferred jobs based on skill differences. In 1944, the Supreme Court of Idaho, in Hagadone v. Kirkpatrick, could take it for granted that: "There is no evidence that claimant
could not have returned to his former job, or when he could return,
or that other jobs of bandsaw filing were not available ....The fact
that claimant refused the two jobs [firing a boiler and common labor]
...would not necessarily render him ineligible ....,234 In 1948, a
skilled weaver who had made $45-50 per week did not need to accept

231 BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA
S. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1974).

(1982). See also, HARRY

117

232Employers are taxed on their contributions to the fund based on an "experience rating"
of past unemployment insurance claims charged to their employment record.
23CIO Dep't of Educ. & Research, 10 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 50, 52 (1949).

- 154 P.2d 181, 182 (Idaho 1944). CompareHallahanv. Riley, 45 A.2d 886, 888 (N.H. 1946)
(skilled mender may not refuse shift to position of unskilled burler on grounds menders can

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:259

a winder's job at $30 per week because she, "lived in a city where there
are 'innumerable mills' and . . . 'she should be given a reasonable

opportunity to realize employment in her regular occupation as a
weaver particularly when she had been unemployed for three days
only."' 235 Yet in 1950 a skilled auto hauler earning $110 per week who,
when laid off during model changes, expected to be recalled in three
weeks, was held to lack good cause to refuse an unskilled job with his
employer for 50% of his previous pay. Suitable work meant all work
the employee was capable of performing: 'The present claimant is
being asked merely to avail himself of the opportunity to support
236
himself while awaiting recall to an employment paying high wages.1
Clearly, there was no need to support a worker's reserve skills where
the same employer merely sought to shift the costs of downtime to the
employee. In Wallace v. Sullivan, a skilled machine operator who received $4.30 per hour and was laid off in a force reduction had the
option, by collective bargain, to accept a seniority rollback by bumping
a grinder paid $3.80 per hour or be laid off and maintain seniority
for twelve months. 2 37 He was ineligible for unemployment compensa2
tion: 38

The record does not show that the work of the grinder would
involve an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff's health, safety
or morals. The plaintiff had worked as a grinder prior to his
promotion to the position of machine operator and was certainly physically fit and properly trained to perform the work
of the grinder ....
In cases wherein the claimant has been offered the next
best available job which his employer has to offer, this Court
and others have held that pay differentials of up to $50.00
per week should be considered acceptable unless reasonable
23 9
alternative employment could be found.

burl, but burlers cannot mend, where worker had been unemployed for considerable time) with
Hagadone 154 P.2d at 182 (bandsaw filer must be allowed lengthy time to search for another
bandsaw filing position for which his experience and training were suited).
Pacific Mills, 77 N.E.2d at 415.
2s Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 82 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1951).
37561 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tenn. 1978).
2-s Id. at 455.
239 I.

at 454. See also Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev. v. W.R. Grace Co., 351 A.2d

297, 299 (Pa. Commw. C. 1976) (laborer grade six must accept offer ofjob as laborer grade five
during layoff even without period of unemployment between claimant's last job and offer of
work).
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And by 1983, in Heltzel v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, a secretary was required to accept any secretarial
position because, 'We can find nothing in the Law which would
permit Claimant to refuse an offer of suitable work simply because
the Employer did not offer the bestjob available." 240 In Aluminum Co.
of America v. Walker, five laid-off senior employees refused an available reassignment to laborer jobs on the grounds that their collective bargaining contract provided maintenance of seniority and
benefits if they were recalled to an equivalent position, but were
forfeited if they agreed to the offered position.2 41 The court held
that, in effect, the employer might determine the employees' insurability:
A payment of unemployment compensation to these men,
notwithstanding their refusal to accept the next best available
work, would have amounted to a financing of each of these
men, within the time limitations of the statute, until there
became available to him his old job or one paying equal
wages ....
It may be that these men exercised good judgment in refusing the next best available job on the chance that there
might be made available in the reasonably near future a job
of their old classification in some department of their employer. Under the evidence and plight of this case, however,
must be charged to the official
this was not a risk which
242
unemployment funds.
Former United States Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan has
reflected upon the changing contemporary administrative policy:
Our [unemployment insurance] laws therefore discourage
workers from seeking jobs in new industries which may pay a
lower initial wage but which may hold the possibility of rewarding new careers. This result simply does not make sense,
either for the individual worker or the economy as a whole.
With the growth of new industries and declining employment
240461 A.2d 1335, 1336 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). CompareBethlehem Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth Unempl. Compensation Bd. of Rev., 310 A.2d 697, 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (skilled
pattern maker entitled to compensation even after refusing offer ofjanitorial position which did
not compare with prior training and experience) with Heltzel 461 A.2d at 1336 (secretary must
take any secretarial work because employer need not offer the bestjob available at her skill level).
Aluminum Co. of America v. Walker, 340 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tenn. 1960).
241
242

Id. at 901, 902.
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in old industries, workers must be challenged to adjust their
lives and their careers to meet changing conditions. 243
Of course, the changing conditions reflect management of the
division of labor. The Chrysler Corporation, for example, was upheld in offering a trim cutter a choice between a position as a
non-skilled press operator and one as a spot welder:
As plaintiff testified before the referee, his basic reason for
refusing to accept the offered employment was that it
would take him out of trim and prevent him from returning
to trim. Acceptance of this personal reason as "good cause"
is precluded by the policy of the employment security
act ....

244

In fact, in some jurisdictions an employer can fire a skilled employee and avoid unemployment compensation by offering an unskilled job that is unlikely to offer advancement even when the old
job is still available:
The fact that the laborer position was offered by the same
employer who had recently dischargedJohnson is not a factor
... in determining "suitability" [of the offered employment]
.... Proof that another position equivalent to an employee's
prior employment is available in the labor market or with the
prospective employer is not a factor which affects whether the
job offered is suitable to the abilities of an employee. The
prospective employee is entitled to suitable work, but he
cannot without forfeiting unemployment benefits choose to
remain unemployed because the prospective employer does
not offer the highest available job for which the employee
245
may be qualified.

243

RaymondJ. Donovan, To Protect and Promote the Interests of the American Worker, 32 LAB.
LJ. 195, 198 (1981).
244Losada v. Chrysler Corp., 180 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970). Losadawas distinguished in Lyscas v. Chrysler Corp., 255 N.W.2d 767, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). In Lyscas,
acceptance of the offered employment would have required the claimant to lose the benefits of
his prior training and experience. Id at 770. The court noted that "a temporary requirement
that he do this should be weighed differently... if the period of unemployment had been lengthy
and the prospects for recall were slight than it would if the period of unemployment had been
brief and the prospects for recall were good." Id.
24
5Johnson v. Virginia EmpI. Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 476, 480-81 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted).
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E. Dependency and Stabilization
Ultimately, as a response to doctrinal interpretations which narrowed eligibility based on the diminished need for a skilled reserve,
the very purpose of the unemployment program was judicially and
administratively recharacterized. Initially, unemployment benefits were
earned entitlements of the wage worker, a governmentally imposed
wage deferral in the form of partial insurance. During and after World
War Ii, the program became one of public welfare in which the recipients were "beneficiaries" of public recognition of their status of deprivation. The sense that benefits were earned dropped out of the discourse. Unemployed workers were considered especially deserving,
and temporarily deserving, poor. Their rights were statutory. Finally,
in the 1970s, unemployment insurance became increasingly a matter
of fiscal stabilization, in which recipients were more like public agents
of aggregate demand supports. The progression obviously disempowers workers by reducing their benefits from something owned, to
something needed, to something useful. Almost simultaneously craftsmen were recharacterized as production or semi-skilled workers, and
then steady workers, only a step above casual laborers. As the unemployment program became more public in conception, it became less
necessary to consider the uniqueness of the recipient in determining
eligibility. As the need for a labor reserve with specific and varied skills
continued to disappear, it became expedient to define eligibility around
public criteria independent of labor relations. Today, it seems inconceivable that courts enforce access to unemployment compensation
within any judicial consciousness of the social wage. In light of contemporary doctrine, who would imagine that the first bill to pass a Committee of Congress during the Depression provided for a wage floor
for all workers to be administered by workers' councils?
One of the main policy reasons for unemployment insurance has
always been to maintain or increase consumption during depressions,
which are usually brought about by over-production or highly skewed
wealth distribution. Both the proponents of the Workers' Bill and the
Wagner-Lewis Bill, after all, argued that insurance was necessary not
only to sustain consumer demand but to overcome the deprivations
associated with lack of income. Lundeen and Van Kleeck scored points
on this issue by emphasizing that the Administration's Bill would not
reach those already unemployed. The issue was always who would be
the recipients of consumption support and on what basis they deserved
it. Supporters of the Workers' Bill believed that if one were willing to
engage in socially productive work, to be either employed or unem-
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ployed counted as being potentially available for work. Moreover, whether
a job was available simply as a chance of the division of labor was a
matter over which workers had all too little control. In passing the
Social Security Act, supporters, including the AFL, took great pains to
distinguish unemployment insurance from relief. They argued that
benefits should be calculated and distributed not on the basis of need,
but on the basis of desert. As the aggregate of employment became
less secure during credit crises, or more characteristically, from technological change that increased productivity and wealth by reducing
labor cost, the worker deserved to be protected as the innocent contributor to the social advance. The worker had earned the insurance.
Quite rapidly, during the 1940s, the justification benefits shifted
from partial insurance against the consequences of unemployment to
partial support for loss of income. Recipients became public beneficiaries
whose need was not the result of either their desire or their fault. The
program could therefore still be characterized as another category of
charitable relief. Earl Simrell, Assistant General Counsel of the Federal
Security Agency, noted in 1945 that courts were reluctant to add to the
employer's experience-rated unemployment fund obligations when it
was not their "fault" for discharging an unneeded or inefficient employee. 246 Note that to the extent Simrell documented this judicial
relegislation of the statute he confirmed the perceived equitable separation of employers' efforts to maximize return on capital from their
private or public contractual employment responsibilities. Simrell, however, explained that: "Unemployment compensation is not a penalty
imposed on the employer because of fault on his part, but rather is an
involuntary contribution for the relief of unemployment attendant
upon his operations. '247 He characterized the purpose of eligibility in
this way: "[T]he general-welfare approach is to interpret 'work' as
meaning suitable work and test the claimant's availability by his attachment to the labor market and his readiness and willingness to work,
rather than his readiness to continue in his last job.''248 If the program
were characterized to recognize that workers had been compelled to
earn their benefits, it would be easier to define the suitable job as that
last held or its equivalent as the court had done in Hagadone. Once
the program is characterized as general welfare, it is the labor market
rather than the employee who is being protected. In both cases, em246

See Earle V. Simrell, Employer Fault vs General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment

Compensation,
55 YALE LJ. 181, 181 (1945).
247
k at 187-88 (quoting Brief of Senate Advisory Committee at 26-27).
248I at 198.
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ployer fault is a red herring. Meanwhile, the equities and policies of
interpretation have shifted, "neutrally," against the receipt of benefits
by unemployed workers.
In 1944, Arthur J. Altmeyer observed the effect of the legislative
change which added the "attributable to the employer" qualification
to the good cause requirement for job separation:
A worker's wages have been credited to his record and enable
him to satisfy the eligibility requirements for insurance payments. Cancellation wipes out in whole or in part the benefit
rights he has earned. Yet now, under the laws of twenty-seven
states, all or some of the wage credits of disqualified workers
can be cancelled-in nineteen of these states for voluntary
2 49
leaving; in twenty-one for refusal of suitable work.
The "earned benefit" is therefore forfeited if a worker fails to continue producing, or renders public support unnecessary by moving
his or her labor to what is perceived as an improved economic
situation. In 1948, the NewJersey Supreme Court, in denying benefits
to a woman who rejected an equivalent job from her former employer, ambiguously defined the purpose of unemployment insurance as a safeguard against economic hazard and an economic
stabilizer:
The public policy upon which the unemployment statute is
built, and which we are to use "as a guide to the interpretation
and application" of the statute.., is to achieve social security
by affording "protection against this greatest hazard of our
economic life," involuntary unemployment, "which now so
often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker
and his family" and constitutes "a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people" of the state; a
security which "can be provided by encouraging employers to
provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide
benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences
of poor relief assistance."

250

Compare this conception of unemployment insurance eligibility to
the purpose expressed early in the program:
249

Altmeyer, supra note 230 at 14.
W.T. Grant Co. v. Board of Rev. of Unempl. Comp. Comm'n, 29 A.2d 858,860 (N.J. 1943).

250
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The class of employers who come under this Act provide or
create the fund out of which the unemployed covered by the
Act are paid a certain compensation for a prescribed time.
To our minds such a plan should not be condemned as
providing for or creating a gratuity. It is true that the employers alone directly create the unemployment fund, but it is
created for the benefit of their employees. Therefore, the
right of such employees to enjoy or participate in the fund in
times of unemployment should be regarded as a part of their
compensation or wages. All employees who labor or perform
services for employers who are covered by this Act labor or
serve in part for the right to enjoy the benefits of this unemployment fund. So regarded, the fund and the benefits to be
derived there-from by unemployed employees cannot be regarded as a gratuity within the meaning of Section 51 of
Article III of our State Constitution. To the contrary, those
who come under its provisions have labored or served for
2 51
such privilege.
Not coincidentally, the statutory changes in eligibility requirements and experience-rated employer contributions, and changes in
judicial interpretation of program policy occurred during the massive
structural dislocations in the economy caused by conversion and reconversion during, and after, wartime. This dislocation made it necessary for substantial numbers of workers to retrain or to find new jobs.
In the case of a 930 per hour tacker, laid off and offered 50¢ per hour
as a laborer at a different company, Pennsylvania's Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review reasoned:
During the period in question the United States Employment
Service of the War Manpower Commission had no job opportunities [in and near Pittsburgh] for women at the rate of 93
cents an hour. The largest volume of positions paid wages at
below 70 cents an hour. The board held: "We are convinced
that in all cases a claimant should have a reasonable opportunity to obtain a position paying wages reasonable [sic] commensurate to those previously earned. Three weeks do not
252
afford such opportunity."
21 Friedman v. American Security Go. of N.Y., 151 S.W.2d 570, 578 (Tex. 1941).
252 American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 46 A.2d 510,511 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1946).
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The Board concluded that one month would be the limit. The
AFL's official policy reflected the need to maintain the purchasing
power of dislocated workers. The policy emphasized support but presaged stabilization:
Loss of jobs to workers would bring loss of markets to industry. Industry cannot produce and expand if millions of workers are unemployed and if those who receive unemployment
compensation are paid amounts which would be below the
level of subsistence for their families. It would start a downward spiral of curtailed production to fit the limited market,
firing of more workers as production is curtailed, a smaller
market, still more unemployment, and a depression worse
than that of the thirties ....
The greatest inducement to get them to stay on war jobs
would be national legislative assurance that they are wanted
enough and have earned the right to be taken care of during
25 3
the reconversion and the mass migration to new jobs.
President Truman's message to Congress asking for emergency legislation to raise unemployment benefits similarly argued:
Decent unemployment benefits would serve as a bulwark
against post-war deflation. By assuring workers of a definite
income for a definite period of time, Congress will help
materially to prevent a sharp decline in consumer expenditures which might otherwise result in a downward spiral of
consumption and production. Adequate unemployment in254
surance is an indispensable form of prosperity insurance.
During the business cycle swings which characterized the 1950s
and 1960s, unemployment insurance policy frequently recognized both
income maintenance and economic stabilization as separate public
goals.2 55 AFL-CIO policy reflected an increasing political emphasis on
stabilization:
2390 Cong. Rec. S6756, S6768-69 (Aug. 8, 1944) (statement of AFL, printed in record at
request of Sen. Davis).
25 4
Harry S. Truman, Truman Message on Idle Pay, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1945, at 10 (text of
President Truman's address to Congress). For additional discussion of the need for unemploy-

ment insurance, see generally W.O. Hake, Against Post-War Collapse 9 EMPLOYMENT SEC. REV.
25-27 (Nov. 1942).
255 Daniel N. Price, Unemployment Insurance Then and Now, 1935-85, 48 Soc. SEC. BULL.
Oct. 1985, at 22, 24.
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[Unemployment Compensation] could be a good "stabilizer"
to even out the booms and slumps. It starts paying automatically-without Congressional debates-when the slump starts,
and pays directly to the people bearing the major personal
burden of recession. U.C. reserves soak up funds in good
times (this is anti-inflationary), and pays them out when stimu256
lation is needed.
Resolution 165, submitted by the AFL-CIO Executive Committee to
the Convention in 1961, recognized a problem with separating wage
insurance from responses to structural economic changes:
While the wage insurance purposes of the program are being
neglected, new problems in the form of long-term unemployment due to economic displacement have arisen and call for
insurance program to
some adaptation of the unemployment
257
new needs on permanent basis.
During the recessions of the 1970s, Congress established the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation. It was established largely as a result of the exhaustion of funds in those states hit
hardest by unemployment. The need for reform forced a reexamination of the program's purpose. As its former Chairman, Wilbur Cohen,
noted:
The Commission's recommended program for supplemental
extensions is similar to the ad hoc emergency programs enacted by the Congress in the early- and mid-1970s. The supplementary extended benefit ("SEB") program recommended
by the Commission would be a major addition to the protection of insured individuals in the labor force. It would also be
a significant part of the federal government's countercyclical
258
fiscal policy.
In CaliforniaDepartment of Human Resources Development v. Java, the
Supreme Court emphasized stabilization arguments from the original hearings on the Social Security Act.2 59 The then-Secretary of
Labor had explained why income replacement would also benefit
256AFL-CIO, How a Better U.C ProgramCan Protect Us All 4
257

LABOR'S ECON. REV.

20 (1959).

AFL-CIO, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 81ST CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 390

(1961).
MWilbur J. Cohen, Reflections on the Work of the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation, 59 U. DEr.J. URB. LAW 485, 501 (1982).
MnCalifornia

Dep't of Human Resources Develop. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971).
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the economy by maintaining demand, from which Justice Burger
concluded: "Finally, Congress viewed unemployment insurance payments as a means of exerting an influence upon the stabilization of
industry .... Early payment of insurance benefits serves to prevent
a decline in the purchasing power of the unemployed, which in turn
serves to aid industries producing goods and services." 2 0 In fact,
unemployment compensation has been cited as the second most
261
important economic stabilizer.
The rhetoric of unemployment policy is by no means uniform.
Neither is it restricted to distinct periods of history. Fiscal stabilization
as a purpose of unemployment insurance was suggested during the
hearings and debate over passage of the Social Security Act. What can
be documented is an increasing emphasis on aggregate employment
and a decreasing emphasis on public support against individual hardship. During the deep downturns of the 1970s and 1980s, only fifty to
fifty-five percent of those unemployed were even eligible to receive
benefits. What is absolutely clear is the disappearance of characterizations
of unemployment insurance as either an earned benefit, or even a
benefit owed to productive members of society whether they are currently laboring or are being held in reserve under the present division
of labor. In fact, workers can no longer expect continuity of employment at all, and thus must be prepared to do for themselves what is
necessary to respond to the privatized labor market. In reviewing the
unemployment compensation program in 1989, Secretary of Labor
Ann McLaughlin illustrated the changed economic assumptions of the
present day:
Workers of the 1930s began their career expecting to stay in
the same occupation throughout their working life. Today
workers no longer have the expectation that they will continue in the same job throughout their working lives. They
increasingly need to be ready to make career changes rather
262
than wait for the return of their previous jobs.
Case law in the state courts also does not represent a uniform and
unbroken string of benefits being denied. Employees do win, but
260 I&

261 George M. von Furstenberg, Stabilization Characteristicsof Unemployment Insurance,29
INDUS. & LAB. REL REv. 363, 364 (1976). For a discussion of supplementary unemployment
benefit programs, see Price, supra note 252, at 31.
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courts give substantial weight to their skill level and experience.2 63
While there is an indeterminacy in the surface doctrines of unemployment insurance relations, it is clear that the discourse is structured by the assumed relation of the State and labor market within
a consumption-driven division of labor. Differences are "different"
only within a distinct political-economy.
It is clear that judicial, official and quasi-official accounts of unemployment insurance have entirely forgotten the contest over enactment of the program, and they have forgotten the degree to which
present law was structured against a proposal for a true social wage.
The social effects of this institutional translation contribute to the
dependency of the wage worker on the state. Whatever entitlements
or "wins" are secured in the legal arena are articulated within a discourse which has already been constructed to assume the worker
should be covered, first, according to the public need for reserved skill
as defined by eligibility requirements, and second, by virtue of the
insulated aggregate division of labor which defines the demand for
skilled eligible workers:
Eligibility and payment levels of existing U.S. social insurance
programs are tied to an individual's work status and work
history. Therefore, the completeness of coverage under OldAge, Disability, and Unemployment Insurance depends on
the consistency of one's career. The income disruptions being
experienced by today's workers will further weaken their position when they need the benefits of these programs.
Unemployment Insurance offers the most striking example
of this process. The standard program, which provides twentysix weeks of coverage at about 40 percent of previous wages,
was designed to meet the cyclical unemployment problems of
industrial society. It appears less suited, however, to the longterm unemployment that is endemic to a postindustrial economy.2

4

The operation of the unemployment insurance system as a mechanism for the individual worker to ensure a rational, personal skill
progression which has been earned by his or her past contributions
263 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Empl. Sec., 568 So.2d 1319, 1320-21
(Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1990) (experienced dining room manager need not accept position as assistant
manager that involved food preparation and cleanup, skills for which he was not trained);
Scheuler v. RCA Corp., 536 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1988) (engineer not suited for
position as systems analyst).
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to society has been rendered unthinkable. William Norwood later
regretted this choice:
One of the things that I began to realize is that the early
concept of availability for work had somehow gotten distorted
into instant availability.... In some instances, what we really
ought to have been doing was encouraging people to be
entering training, rather than to be immediately available for
the first job that came along. To upgrade their skills, take
advantage of the time between jobs to move up in the occu2 65
pational hierarchy.
Workers will still contest their loss of power, whether it be economic
or legal. Their ability to make any gains, however, is contained by
the terms in which that struggle is cast. A social wage administered
by worker's councils would have empowered the wage worker not
only because the terms of the programs would have been more
favorable, but also because those terms would have recognized the
dignity of the contribution of labor to social construction and reproduction.
IV. STRUGGLE RECALLED: CONTESTABLE LAW

This article recovers the political history of the rank and file
workers who were opposed to elite labor leaders, and the social security
politics of the Roosevelt Administration. It also demonstrates acknowledgement of those politics in, and their impact on, the unemployment
insurance legislation which was ultimately passed. It documents the
legal and historical amnesia which is apparent in judicial interpretations of eligibility requirements for such insurance. Through these
interpretations, the judiciary implements a politically driven jurisprudence which is more accommodating to a general structure of labor
law that reinforces capital control over the division of labor. As a result
of this exercise of judicial power, which is encouraged by orthodox
history and orthodox jurisprudence, workers lost what presence they
had won in the 1930s.
There are obvious advantages of self-perpetuation to a legal methodology which creates social winners and losers while maintaining the
discourse of neutrality. Such a methodology is also oppressive and
antidemocratic. The oppression of "winner's" law occurs when the
265
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"loser's" voice is disowned in the legal construct of the decision, indeed
when voice is denied to all sides of a social interaction, as if a more
inclusive vision of the law never seriously existed. Precisely because
social experience is known in part by the way it is framed in law, in
order to be historically authentic, our own legal consciousness must
reconnect our present legal constructions to the sense of hardship and
conflict which was and is the social context we still live within:
The modern narrative must range across all the levels of
society, from material conditions of daily life through the
forms of social organization to the structures of state power.
It must come to terms with the role of human agency-ordinary as well as extraordinary people-and with the irreconcilable antagonisms that drive society from one state of unstable equilibrium to the next. In short, what is needed is a
2 66
narrative of contradiction.
The exclusion from legal consciousness and method of a dialectical
understanding of the contingency of power is deeply defended and
multiply masked. Strip away these costumes. First, law is not episodic
but on-going; past deployments of legal power exert a hold on
future legal contests, however formally fair. Second, understanding
legal consciousness requires that we do more than reveal the social
meanings which are taken as "natural" in prevailing legal texts. 67 As
David Montgomery reminds us, power may be exercised linguistically, but it is not simply language:
Academic fashions of the 1950s are now enjoying a new lease
on life ....
The first is an enthusiasm for the analysis of
discourse as the decisive mechanism in the shaping (as well
as the understanding) of human relations. Although students
of working-class culture have often devoted close attention to
analysis of popular rhetoric for clues to understanding what
E.P. Thompson called "the dialogue between social being and
social consciousness," disciples of Derrida and Foucault would
have us believe, contrary to Marx, that it is the social con266ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLEs FORJUSTICE 12 (1991).

267 Especially if the production of ideas is no different in principle from the production of
the material meaning-laden world, legal consciousness includes the dialectic of the relationsread, as required, struggle--of social action correlated to law. SeeKenneth M. Casebeer, Work on
a Labor Theory of Meaning 10 CARDozo L. REv. 1637, 1659 (1989).
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sciousness of people that determines their social being. Historical research is thus reduced to the analysis of texts .... 268
The Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill symbolizes a story of
voice and action. Its history represents an idea and political way of life
not chosen in any winner's sense. But the Bill was simultaneously a
legislative event which did have impact. It was both voice and action,
as is all struggle. What is typical and meaningful about understanding
social meanings such as history and law in terms of the struggles which
these discourses manifest, and which construct them, is that the struggles continue regardless of what symbolic meaning is imposed on
them. Their actual meaning is experiential, not discursive. In these
terms, the recovery of the Workers' Bill's history challenges both historians and legal practitioners.
To read the history of labor organization as exceptional in the
United States necessitates reading it within the frame of history as it is
constructed by dominant institutions, including those which prevail in
law. This practice involves two intellectual mistakes. First, the history
of American labor politics as exceptional depends upon an historical
determinism which is incompatible with the actual experience of workers in the United States. Second, the history of labor law as exceptional
depends upon a distorted view of law making and interpretation.
Neither these mistakes nor what actually happened are accidental.
Labor law and labor politics in the United States are particular, and
especially so in their interrelationship. Organized labor, however divided, allied itself politically with progressive scientific management to
elect industrial pluralism as a structure of collective organization and
privatized economic planning. This structure was to be legally preserved in the separation of investment and employment. At the same
time, organized labor acceded to individualized risk pooling for social
injuries and simultaneously rationalized labor reserves. But these outcomes have more than one layer of historical meaning. They do represent the rejection of a different legal-political ideology, but a rejection in the context of an opposed and present alternative-that of
social democracy and a social wage. Thus, to make the United States
exceptional is to hide the political struggles imminent and visible in
the very role of law; it pretends methodological virtue in legally forgetting what cannot indefinitely be ignored. The voices our history has
26S David Montgomery, The Limits of Unions-CenteredHistory:Responses to Howard Kiweldorf,
31 LAB. HIST. 110, 115 (1991).
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lost resonate in the social conditions of their figurative children's
children, and in the misery the law and state perpetuate.
To read the legal discourse of labor law as devoid of contested
terms, in turn, masks an orthodoxy of political economy. In American
work law generally, a particular assumed image of naturalemployment
relations and labor market organization determines what counts as a
legally contestable issue. Structurally, as society's agents, employers
need control over investment decisions and the maximum potential
mobility for their capital. Such mobility would be sacrificed if public
regulation of employment relations either directly or implicitly broke
down the separation between organizational production decisions (investment) and inducement of workers to provide their own capitallabor-to production processes (employment). Instead, legal mechanisms maintain and enforce the separation of invested resource allocation
and exchange relations eliciting labor time.
A contract for labor time gives labor the legal form of a commodity
rather than an investment, but this artifice does not support an argument that labor must or should be so treated. Rather, it is a demonstration of how the phenomenology of law imagines labor in the
simultaneous mirroring and constructing of reality. By contrast, when
law is about labor markets or social structures rather than labor relations, two primary conceptual premises of reasoning change radically.
Most importantly, the abstract conception of labor assumes employment and unemployment to be aspects of the same object. Labor
becomes for society something like a natural resource, both potentially
and actually in use and on inventory. Second, to the extent the labor
image is utilized in arguments for instrumental policy purposes, law
characterizes employers and employees as aggregates or classes of
social actors, not as individuated interests, because such policies aim
at a social labor pool.
Unemployment insurance during the 1930s was contested. The
legislation enacted was passed in preference to an alternative social
wage. Nevertheless, the program's articulated purpose would be recharacterized by various legal institutions, principally the judiciary, as
if the contest never existed. Successive recharacterization from earned
entitlement, to public welfare, to fiscal policy was not neutral. The
ongoing hardships and conflict associated with the loss of ajob are the
same in kind as those which animated the original contest during the
1930s. Not to continuously and presently make the social conditions
of parties to adjudication part of the interpretive framework simply
denies a part of the ongoing constructive meaning of law within those
conditions of hardship.
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As the discourse shifted within this historical vacuum, of course,
the doctrines interpreting the same provisions were significantly tightened in simultaneous reflection and construction of a changing labor
market. Doctrinal development was hardly neutral as employers needed
fewer reserve skills and constructed a division of labor utilizing cheaper
labor which was less eligible for relief against the hardships of unemployment and was more fungibly reemployed ifjobs became available.
An alternative was not only legally available, but the Workers' Bill
was a necessary, if forgotten, part of the history of the enactment of
unemployment insurance. The social relationship between worker and
job inevitably frames not only the economic value of work, but the
quality of the division of social obligations and possibilities. The Workers' Bill would have legally constructed a true social wage-a wage floor
administered by workers. The Workers' Bill social wage would have
drawn no distinction between the bottom wage of the employed and
unemployed either as a matter of individualized desert or in fact.
The unemployment insurance program which was adopted, and
the unemployment insurance system as it has been judicially constructed, also comprise a social wage. The formulation of this social
wage, however, fragments social relations into separate classes: the
employed, whose wages are elicited by the private market; the eligible,
whose wages are provided by compensation; and the ineligible, whose
wages are haphazard or depend on welfare. Under either conceptual
system, however, employment and unemployment are the same phenomena with regard to their potential functioning in the reproduction
of society.
Less exceptional than the fact that the labor movement in the
United States did not establish a labor party is what did not happen to
the country: that a workers' movement never appeared, or that workers
engaged in no identifiable politics. One would never know this from
existing historical and legal discourse. Indeed, the fact that the workers' organized labor politics reflected and constructed different institutions from elsewhere, and resulted in reduced political power or in
narrow visions of wage or production conditions, does not diminish
the workers' impact. In the 1930s, workers were vitally engaged in the
politics of law. If they did not prevail, still they were heard, and the
content of Social Security, then and now, can be fully understood only
by including the workers' role in the process:
The organized sponsors of this vital measure [Workers' Bill]
were compelled to risk imprisonment, injury and even violent
death at the hands of police, by participating in street dem-
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onstrations, Hunger Marches, and other militant actions by
means of which attention was focused on the need and demand for genuine social insurance. Advocates of the Workers'
Bill even had to face abuse and risk expulsion from their
trade unions and other organizations because the influence
of the privileged class reached into even workers' organizations with poisonous propaganda against the Workers' Bill.2 69
The recovery of the history of political struggle, however, is no
substitute for the continuous renegotiation of the social conditions
whose experience constructs social meaning in the interplay of alienation and authenticity. A contested history, however, can be made part
of the current, inevitable contest over the legitimation of present
conditions and relations. Law was part of past conflict as surely as it is
part of present conflict. Law is not above us, or below us, or any more
neutral than our own lives. Law is simply one of the forms by which
we live those lives-blind or self-aware. Whose lives count in law which
becomes history, or history imported into law shape each of us. If we
ignore the excluded in our discourse, we ignore part of ourselves and
limit our possibilities. Senator Robert Wagner described the prosperous Twenties and not the collapse of the Thirties in order to force
recognition of the need for continuous collective responsibility for the
others in our midst by which we learn what kind of people we are
ourselves:
Twenty million families were living in the cold cellars of
poverty dug beneath the streets of our prosperous cities.
Countless children were being denied the simple joys of carefree childhood, their minds handicapped by improper schooling, their bodies racked by the relentless pressure of factory
work. Misery and destitution were the sordid realities of every
Main Street, not in a poverty stricken country, but in a land
where the inequitable distribution of tremendous wealth was
building palaces from which the favored few might survey the
27 0
hardship of the multitudes.
Then as now.
269 Herbert Benjamin, Introduction to the Workers' Unemployment, Old Age and Social Insurance
Bill, H.R. 2827,National Joint Action Committee for Genuine Social Insurance (1935) (on file
with Tamiment Library, New York University).
27°Robert Wagner, Undelivered Speech, Madison Square Garden, May 1935 (on file with
Wagner Papers, supra note 11).

